WordPress

Tag: Western Sahara

  • Sahara Occidental : Les réactions internationales se poursuivent suite à l’agression du Maroc

    UNE SEMAINE APRÈS L’AGRESSION MAROCAINE À EL GUERGUERAT : Les réactions internationales se poursuivent

    Le ministre délégué chargé du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique du nord auprès du ministre des Affaires étrangères britannique, James Cleverly, a exhorté toutes les parties « à éviter une nouvelle escalade » suite à l’agression militaire marocaine contre des civils sahraouis à El-Guerguerat , appelant « au retour, le plus tôt possible, au processus politique mené sous l’égide de l’ONU ».

    «Nous suivons de près la situation à El Guerguerat au Sahara occidental, j’exhorte toutes les parties à éviter une nouvelle escalade et à retourner, le plus tôt possible, au processus politique mené sous l’égide des Nations unies afin de parvenir à une solution politique à long terme pour le peuple du Sahara occidental », a-t-il souligné. De son côté le ministre russe des Affaires étrangères, Sergueï Lavrov, a réaffirmé la position de principe de la Russie en faveur du règlement du conflit au Sahara occidental sur la base des principes universellement reconnus du droit international. M. Lavrov a appelé »à renforcer » l’accord du cessez-le-feu signé en 1991 entre le Front Polisario et le Maroc et « à désamorcer la tension qui s’est développée ces derniers jours dans la zone tampon de Guerguerat. Au cours de l’entretien, Sergueï Lavrov a réaffirmé la position de principe de la Russie en faveur du règlement de la question du Sahara occidental « exclusivement par des méthodes politiques et diplomatiques fondées sur les principes universellement reconnus du droit international ». À savoir le droit à l’autodétermination comme l’a rappelé la Russie lors de la résolution du Conseil de sécurité renouvelant le mandat de la Minurso.

    Par ailleurs des ONG britanniques ont fermement condamné l’agression militaire contre les sahraouis. Pour sa part l’’ONG britannique de solidarité avec le peuple sahraoui (Western Sahara campaign UK), a mis en garde contre les « visées expansionnistes » du Maroc sur Nouadhibou, si Rabat parvient à annexer Guerguerat. »En plus d’être une nouvelle confiscation illégale du territoire sahraoui (…) une telle mesure mettrait fin à l’indépendance de la Mauritanie car elle donnerait (au Maroc) le contrôle de la deuxième ville du pays Nouadhibou et ses exportations de minerai de fer, permettant à Rabat de dicter la politique de la Mauritanie envers la population sahraouie » ainsi que le transit vers et depuis les camps de réfugiés », a souligné l’ONG, dans un briefing sur l’agression militaire marocaine à El Guerguerat au Sahara occidental, intitulé « pourquoi le Polisario a repris les opérations armées ? « .

    L’ONG a rappelé que cela faisait presque 30 ans que le Front Polisario a fait preuve de bonne foi et accepté un cessez-le-feu sous réserve de la tenue du référendum d’autodétermination .Western Sahara Campaign , souligne que le Maroc, a complètement enfreint les termes du cessez-le-feu » qui interdit la présence de forces armées dans la zones tampon. Elle est revenue sur les causes à l’origine du conflit au Sahara occidental et souligné l’incapacité de l’ONU à régler la crise à El Guerguerat, ce qui illustre, selon elle, « l’échec plus large du Conseil de Sécurité à organiser un referendum, permettant aux Sahraouis de déterminer l’avenir de leur patrie, base même de l’accord de cessez-le-feu de 1991″. Elle a évoqué également l’’intensification par le Maroc du trafic à travers la brèche illégale de Guerguerat pour « exporter des ressources pillées au Sahara occidental », la vacance du poste de l’envoyé personnel du SG de l’ONU, et l’incapacité de la Mission des Nations unies pour l’organisation d’un référendum au Sahara occidental (Minurso) de surveiller les droits de l’Homme », et la « manipulation du Conseil de sécurité par le Maroc et son « parrain » la France ».

    Western Sahara Campaign UK alerte aussi contre les conséquences de la crise actuelle et, en particulier, contre ce qu’elle qualifie de risque de « reprise des hostilités à grande échelle entre les deux parties et en conséquence la détérioration de la situation géopolitique dans l’ensemble du Maghreb ».

    Basée au Royaume Uni, Western Sahara Campaign soutient, depuis plusieurs années, la cause sahraouie. Elle était à l’origine de l’action judiciaire contre l’accord de pêche entre le Maroc et l’Union européenne devant les juridictions britanniques et la Cour de justice de l’UE.
    M. Bendib

    Tags : #SaharaOccidental #Polisario #Maroc #WesternSahara

  • Trafic de drogue, milices et résilience: El Guerguerat, la frontière du Sahara Occidental envahie par le Maroc

    Depuis deux décennies, le Maroc a utilisé ce passage frontalier entre le Sahara occidental et la Mauritanie pour aggraver les tensions avec le Front Polisario.

    David Bollero

    Depuis le 21 octobre dernier, un grand groupe de civils sahraouis a bloqué le poste-frontière d’El Guerguerat qui relie le Sahara occidental à la Mauritanie. L’objectif du blocus est double, d’une part, attirer à nouveau l’attention internationale sur la situation dramatique que traverse le peuple sahraoui depuis 45 ans et, d’autre part, arrêter le trafic illicite de marchandises – y compris le trafic de drogue – qui a lieu en ce passage frontalier qui, selon le Front Polisario, viole les accords conclus dans le cadre de l’ONU.

    Le Guerguerat, comme le reste du Sahara occidental, n’appartient pas légalement au Maroc. La différence, en outre, réside dans le fait que même le royaume alaouite ne l’assume pas, puisque selon les accords militaires conclus par les deux parties, la région se trouve dans la soi-disant zone de séparation. En fait, ces accords n’établissent que quatre points sur lesquels on peut passer d’un côté du soi-disant «mur de la honte» à l’autre et El Guerguerat n’en fait pas partie, comme l’a rappelé le Front Polisario MINURSO (Mission des Nations Unies pour le référendum au Sahara occidental, Colin Stewart.

    Malgré cela, ce passage frontalier est devenu une route courante utilisée même par les pêcheurs espagnols qui déchargent leurs prises dans la ville mauritanienne de Nouadhibou et de là les transportent en camions à travers le Sahara occidental et le Maroc jusqu’à la péninsule. . Selon les autorités sahraouies, le trafic de marchandises, dont beaucoup résultent de pillages illégaux auxquels le Sahara occidental est soumis, ne passe aucun contrôle ou inspection douanière en raison de la passivité internationale et de l’intérêt du gouvernement marocain.

    Le 6 septembre dernier a marqué le 29e anniversaire de la signature du cessez-le-feu qui a mis fin à 16 ans de guerre entre le Front Polisario et le Maroc. Bien qu’en 1991, le “Mur de la honte”, long de 2 700 kilomètres, avait déjà divisé le Sahara occidental en deux, avec plus de sept millions de mines antipersonnel à proximité, lorsque le cessez-le-feu est entré en vigueur, cette région était légalement un territoire unifié. Le maintien du mur a été adopté comme une simple mesure de séparation entre les deux armées en attendant la célébration du référendum d’autodétermination. Près de trois décennies et 45 ans se sont écoulés depuis que le peuple sahraoui a été dépouillé de ses terres.

    Un extrême qui a été ratifié lors de réunions ultérieures, comme c’est le cas du troisième cycle de pourparlers directs qui s’est tenu à Lisbonne, au Portugal, le 29 août 1997, dans lequel il est souligné que «cet accord ne changera en rien, il n’affectera ni ne modifiera en aucun cas les frontières internationalement reconnues du Sahara occidental et ne servira pas de précédent pour affirmer qu’il y a eu des changements ou des altérations à leur sujet. ” Malgré cela, le Maroc essaie périodiquement d’étendre ses dominions vers le sud.

    Deux décennies de provocation

    La controverse avec cette étape n’est pas nouvelle. Dans le souvenir le plus récent, il y a les mobilisations qui ont eu lieu en 2016, lorsque le Maroc a tenté d’asphalter à cet endroit la piste de terre qui se dirige vers la Mauritanie. Le Front Polisario a ensuite dénoncé la violation du cessez-le-feu, une circonstance initialement niée par le Maroc et la MINURSO, jusqu’à ce que l’agence de presse Associated Press divulgue un document confidentiel de l’ONU dans lequel il a été révélé qu’en effet, le Maroc commis une telle infraction.

    Cependant, ce n’est qu’en février 2017 que le Maroc a décidé de retirer ses troupes, éteignant ainsi les tambours de guerre. Deux mois plus tard, dans la résolution 2351 du 28 avril, le Conseil de sécurité a déclaré que «la récente crise dans la zone de séparation de Guerguerat soulève des questions fondamentales liées à l’accord de cessez-le-feu».

    Cependant, l’intention du Maroc de construire une autoroute n’a pas commencé en 2016. Il est nécessaire de remonter près de deux décennies, jusqu’en 2001, lorsque, comme détaillé dans le rapport du Secrétaire général Kofi Annan S / 2001/398, ” Le 15 mars 2001, les autorités militaires marocaines ont informé la MINURSO de leur intention de commencer à construire une route goudronnée dans le coin sud-ouest du Sahara occidental, à travers la zone de séparation de 5 kilomètres, jusqu’à atteindre la Mauritanie près de Nouadhibou “.

    Violation de l’accord militaire

    Selon ce rapport, le représentant spécial de l’époque, William Eagleton, ainsi que le chef de la MINURSO, le général Claude Buze, “ont averti leurs contacts civils et militaires marocains que le projet de construction de la route soulevait des questions difficiles et impliquait des activités. cela pourrait constituer des violations de l’accord de cessez-le-feu. “

    Depuis lors, le Front Polisario a dénoncé non seulement l’accord de cessez-le-feu qui est entré en vigueur le 6 septembre 1991 (il y a 29 ans) et qui a mis fin à 16 ans de guerre, mais également violé Aussi accord militaire numéro 1. Ce dernier document, signé entre le Front Polisario et la MINURSO en décembre 1997 et entre le Maroc et la MINURSO en janvier 1998, complète celui du cessez-le-feu.

    Les accords militaires divisent le Sahara occidental en cinq zones: deux zones réglementées (à 25 kilomètres à l’est du mur de la honte et à 30 kilomètres à l’ouest de celui-ci), deux autres zones de restriction partielle couvrant le reste du Sahara occidental et une zone de Séparation de 5 kilomètres de large à l’est du mur, où se trouve El Guerguerat, où l’entrée de personnel ou d’équipement de l’armée royale marocaine est considérée comme une violation des accords.

    Le Front Polisario dénonce désormais le déploiement d’un contingent de la Gendarmerie royale marocaine déguisé en civils, ainsi que la présence dans la zone de hauts commandants militaires du royaume alaouite, ce qui représente une autre violation grave du cessez-le-feu et ouvre encore plus la possibilité d’une “nouvelle guerre totale dans la région”, selon le représentant légitime du peuple sahraoui.

    Les événements rappellent dramatiquement un autre événement tragique qui a lieu en novembre: les dix ans du massacre de Gdeim Izik, le démantèlement du camp de protestation pacifique installé à l’extérieur d’El Aaiún, qui a laissé derrière lui la mort des Sahraouis. Nayem Elgarhi, 14 ans, en plus d’une longue liste de prisonniers politiques qui risquent 20 et 30 ans de prison et la réclusion à perpétuité, et la torture aux mains du Maroc.

    De contraction à contraction

    Les affrontements majeurs d’El Guerguerat ont toujours été associés à des polémiques parallèles au conflit central, à savoir la violation du droit international par le Maroc, qui continue d’occuper illégalement un territoire qui ne lui appartient pas.

    En 2016, le climat était déjà tendu à l’époque, non seulement parce qu’en début d’année les soldats marocains avaient abattu Ashmad Djuli, un berger sahraoui qui gardait son bétail à proximité du «Mur de la honte», mais aussi parce que le Ensuite, le secrétaire général de l’ONU, Ban Ki-moon, a décidé de se rendre au Sahara occidental avant la fin de son mandat. Cette visite et ayant qualifié la présence du Maroc dans cette région d ‘”occupation” a conduit le Maroc à expulser 73 membres de la MINURSO.

    Le terme «occupation» a irrité Mohamed VI alors que, en pleine guerre et toujours avec son père Hassan II à la tête du royaume, l’Assemblée des Nations Unies se prononçait dans ces mêmes termes. Dans sa résolution 34/37 du 21 novembre 1979 et “après avoir examiné en profondeur la question du Sahara occidental”, l’ONU a réaffirmé “le droit inaliénable du peuple du Sahara occidental à l’autodétermination”, reconnaissant la “légitimité de la lutte qu’il libère d’exercer ce droit conformément aux dispositions des résolutions pertinentes de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine >>. En outre, la résolution a également profondément déploré «l’aggravation de la situation, conséquence de l’occupation persistante du Sahara occidental par le Maroc et l’extension de cette occupation au territoire récemment évacué par la Mauritanie».

    Une MINURSO inefficace

    En revanche, ce climat de tension n’a en rien été atténué par le dernier renouvellement du mandat de la MINURSO, le 30 octobre. Dans ce renouveau, aucune mention n’est même faite du référendum d’autodétermination qui, comme son nom l’indique, est le but de cette mission de paix. De plus, elle reste la seule mission de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies qui, malgré les demandes répétées du Front Polisario, n’envisage pas de garantir le respect des droits de l’homme.

    Au fil des années, la passivité des Nations Unies face à cette question a provoqué le découragement du peuple sahraoui, qui n’est plus satisfait que l’instance internationale exprime sa << profonde inquiétude face aux épreuves constantes subies par les réfugiés sahraouis et sa dépendance à l’aide humanitaire extérieure. ” Des faits dénoncés à plusieurs reprises, comme le fait que les mêmes véhicules de la MINURSO portent des plaques d’immatriculation marocaines, ne suggèrent pas l’impartialité, comme en témoigne le rapport du Secrétaire général Ban Ki-moon sur la situation concernant le Sahara occidental S / 2015/246, dans lequel il est indiqué que «la perception de l’impartialité de la MINURSO et des Nations Unies continue d’être affectée par le fait que les véhicules de la MINURSO circulent avec des plaques d’immatriculation marocaines à l’ouest de la berme [le mur]». Un fait qu’on a même vu ces jours-ci à El Guerguerat, malgré le fait que l’engagement du Maroc auprès de la MINURSO d’échanger toutes ces plaques contre celles de l’ONU date de 2014.

    Des rapports, même antérieurs à la résolution 690 du Conseil de sécurité établissant définitivement la MINURSO, comme ceux du Secrétaire général Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, S / 22464 et S / 21360, tous deux datant de 1990, dans lesquels Il a défini le rôle de cette mission de maintien de la paix et les phases du référendum avec lesquelles “le peuple du Sahara occidental choisira librement et démocratiquement entre l’indépendance et l’intégration avec le Maroc” ou même détaillé la manière dont le recensement devait être effectué. , ayant “le droit de vote à tous les indigènes du Sahara occidental, âgés de 18 ans ou plus, qui sont inscrits au recensement effectué par les autorités espagnoles en 1974 et qui se trouvent actuellement sur le territoire ou sur 61 en tant que réfugiés ou pour une autre raison, “accorder aux prisonniers” une amnistie générale et complète “.

    À l’heure actuelle, et malgré les dénonciations continues d’organisations internationales telles qu’Amnesty International ou Democracy Now!, Le Maroc viole les droits humains au Sahara Occidental et expulse les militants et les journalistes qui tentent de documenter de telles exactions. 

    Source : Publico.es, 14 nov 2020

    Tags : #SaharaOccidental #Polisario #Maroc #WesternSahara

  • Western Sahara conflict tests Turkey-Algeria ties

    The cold war between Saudi-led Arab states and Ankara is expanding to new territory. This is bad news for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who wanted to contain the tensions. While Turkey hoped to improve ties through back…

    Read more from the source : Al-Monitor

     

     

     

     

    Tags : Algeria, Turkey, Western Sahara,

  • Jordan to open consulate in Western Sahara amid dispute

    RABAT (Reuters) – Jordan will open a consulate in Western Sahara, Morocco said on Thursday, in an apparent show of support for Rabat after the disputed territory’s Polisario independence movement said it was returning to an armed…

    Read more from the source : Reuters

     

     

     

     

    Tags : Western Sahara, Jordan, consulate,

  • Western Sahara: Who are the Polisario Front and what do they want ?

    Salmi Gailano was born in 1991, the year that Morocco agreed to a ceasefire with the rebels of the Polisario Front after almost two decades of warfare in Western Sahara : Despite the peace, Gailani has grown up in exile. His childhood was spent in refugee camps of the Polisario-held territory near the Algerian border and in Spain.

    Read more from the source : Euronews

     

     

     

     

     

    Tags : Western Sahara, Morocco, Polisario Front,

  • Polisario Front declares war on Morocco over Western Sahara region

    Known to some as Africa’s last colony, nearly 80 per cent of Western Sahara was annexed by Morocco Back in 1675. A smaller area is controlled by the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Reoublic, a liberation movement of Saharan people. At the weeken, their army broke a 29-year-old ceasefire and declared war on Morocco.

    Read more from the source : Euronews

     

     

     

     

    Tags : Western Sahara, Polisario, Morocco,

  • May Algerie monthly report (4/4)

    Security

    After a period of several months in which its presence in the north of Algeria appeared to be waning, Aqmi’s activity picked up notably in late April and early May. The last week of April was the busiest in terms of jihadist activity since early July 2012, and the whole month was the busiest since August 2012. Fourteen jihadist operations were recorded in April (up from seven in March, seven in February and eight in January) and six in the first half of May. The security forces initially lagged behind, with only seven operations reported in April (comparable to March) but appear to have stepped up their efforts in May, with eight operations recorded in the first half of the month.
    ALGIERS and its environs remained quiet. The most noteworthy incidents in northern Algeria took place in the WEST[8]. During the night of April 20-21, a jihadist group attacked a convoy of Italian staff heading to a work site near Theniet el-Had, between the wilayas of Aïn Defla and Tissemsilt. The attackers first shelled the convoy with home-made mortars (heb heb) and then attacked directly, but the gendarmes escorting the convoy fired back and repulsed them, according to London-based According to Al-Qods Al-Arabi. It is believed the jihadists were trying to kidnap the Italian staff. Three gendarmes were wounded in the operation but none of the foreign nationals were hurt[9]. Also of note was the arrest by the security forces two jihadists in the town of Chlef on May 3, one of whom was found to be carrying a suicide belt according to the Algerian press – an indication that suicide bombings remain a possibility in the north of country, despite a lull in the use of this tactic. 
    The oil and gas producing regions of the SOUTH saw at least three incidents. On April 24 armed men attacked a civil engineering team working on the road between Hassi Messaoud and El-Oued and made away with an offroader. A force of gendarmes chased the assailants, forcing them to abandon the vehicle, according to the Algerian press. The recurrent carjackings and acts of brigandry around Hassi Messaoud notably indicate security is still not optimal in the region (El Watan on May 11 published a long article on “exceptional security measures” in the town, but a close reading shows these are aimed mostly at angry local protesters calling for jobs, not against jihadist activity). Near In Amenas, wilaya of Illizi, the security forces arrested a group of “Libyan terrorists” driving an offroader, Algeria’s privately owned Ennahar TV claimed on May 8 (the station did not give the exact date or any further details on the incident). Two other Libyans travelling in a 4WD vehicle were arrested by the Algerian security forces inside Algerian territory near Debdeb, wilaya of Illizi, on or around May 17. They were found to be carrying Kalashnikovs and satellite phones. On May 21, a group of around 15 terrorists is reported to have attacked a convoy of gendarmes escorting a prisoner transport in the wilaya of Illizi (L’Expression 22/05). Several gendarmes were wounded, one seriously, but none of the prisoners, all held on terrorism charges, were freed. The authorities suspect AQMI-offshoot MUJAO of being behind the failed operation, according to L’Expression (which did not specify the exact location of the incident). 
    Elsewhere in the south, an Algerian army position near Tinzaouatin, wilaya of Tamanrasset, on the border with Mali, was hit by “rocket shells” from Mali on April 25 and riposted by shelling over the border. El-Khabar (27/04) reported that the attack was the work of “jihadist groups” and had “nothing to do with French or Chadian forces in northern Mali”. Two days later, the army killed two “armed men” who were trying to cross into Algeria from Mali near Tinzaouatin (El-Khabar 28/04). On the border with Libya, the Algerian army clashed with a jihadist group near Djanet, wilaya of Illizi, on April 26, an operation that left two jihadists dead and two soldiers wounded according to El-Khabar (27/04), while Echorouk reported that the operation started when Algerian army surveillance aircraft spotted a convoy of four offroaders with armed men on board that tried to cross into Algerian territory from Libya. The Algerian press also reported that a “heavily armed group” attacked and robbed the post office at Bordj Baji Mokhtar (wilaya of Adrar) on May 13 and “fled over the border into Mali”, although the next day the Gendarmerie issued a statement describing the event as a “criminal robbery” and ruling out “any terrorist involvement”.

    [1] The nom-de-guerre of DRS chief Lt-Gen. Mohamed Médiène.

    [2] This is, however, dismissed by another source with close knowledge of the workings of the DRS, who argues that Tewfik, having received his formative training from the KGB in the Soviet Union, has as his model the founder of the Cheka (the KGB’s forerunner) Felix Dzerzhinsky, who worked on through years of illness and died of a heart attack after delivering a speech to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

    [3] Publication was blocked by the authorities at the last minute, and the papers’ proprietor Hichem Aboud has reportedly been charged with “harming state security”. Aboud, who was once editor in chief of theArmy’s mouthpiece El Djeïch, is thought to have ties to the DRS and/or sections of the military hierarchy.

    [4] In 2012, Gen. Tahar Yala issued at least two statements in the name of his new organisation and gave a number of interviews in which he called for “radical change” but did not hold forth at length on the theme of corruption and carefully avoided attacking Bouteflika personally.

    [5] Although Gen. Tahar Yala does not suggest it explicitly, one option might be impeachment under article 88 of the constitution, which allows for a sitting head of state to be removed on grounds of “serious and lasting illness”. This possibility has been floated in the last few days by dissident human rights lawyer Ali Yahia Abdenour.

    [6] “The security of [Tunisia and Libya] is a matter for those countries. I will not comment. We secure our borders from within.” There is no infiltration of terrorists from these countries, and “even if there are one or two, they are arrested very swiftly. The Tiguentourine incident will not happen again.”

    [7] Back in December, Algerian Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia visited Tunis for talks on security and border issues, while Algerian Gendarmerie Commander Maj-Gen. Ahmed Boustila inspected new installations and units along the border with Tunisia (16 new advanced posts for the border guards, seven new intervention squads and an air squadron).

    [8] Although most of north-west Algeria has been largely free of jihadist a
    ctivity for several years, small groups remain active in the wilayas of Ain Defla, Chlef and Tipaza, responsible for one or two incidents every month.

    [9] This incident was not was not reported this way in mainstream Algerian press. El-Watan (21/04) reported an APS story that “three gendarmes were wounded on April 21 by a roadside bomb explosion near Theniet el-Had”. No mention at all of foreign nationals. El-Khabar (22/04) reported “roadside bomb hits escort of foreign workers”, without giving details of the nature of the attack or the nationality of the foreign workers.

    Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel
    President and CEO
    The Gabriel Company, LLC
    1220 L Street NW, Suite 411
    Washington DC, 20005
    Phone: +1 202.887.1113
    Fax: +1 202.887.1115

  • May Algerie monthly report (3/4)

    Foreign Relations

    Algeria has tightened security on its western border with Morocco, establishing 24 new monitoring points to combat smuggling of subsidised food products and fuel, Interior Minister Daho Ould Kablia announced at a press conference on May 13. Ould Kablia slammed what he termed the “passivity” of the Moroccan authorities with regard to cross-border smuggling:
    We are doubly penalized. The smugglers take fuel out of the country and bring drugs in. We are forced to import fuel oil, pending the launch of the four new refineries [that are planned]. […] I raised this issue with my Moroccan counterpart. I told him that if the Moroccan authorities do not make an effort, things will not move forward.
    While the new anti-smuggling measures undoubtedly do constitute a response (albeit an inadequate one) to a very real problem, Ould Kablia’s public grumbling about the attitude of the Moroccan authorities may also be in part politically motivated. As we noted in our last report, the Bouteflika camp, of which Ould Kablia is a key member, has every interest in amplifying traditional points of discord between Algeria and Morocco in order to prevent the question of inter-Maghreb relations and normalisation with Rabat gaining any traction in the run-up the 2014 presidential election. In a telling contrast, at the same press conference Ould Kablia tended to downplay problems on the borders with Libya and Tunisia[6].
    The danger to the east is, however, far greater. Indeed, Algeria’s border with Morocco is in most respects its least troublesome frontier these days, the perennial problem of smuggling notwithstanding. The French-led military intervention in northern Mali has pushed AQMI and its allies right up to the Malian-Algerian border, where incursions and clashes have been frequent. The 1,000 km long border with Libya has theoretically been closed since the war of 2011, but it remains impossible to shut the jihadists out entirely, even after security was supposedly enhanced in the wake of the In Amenas attack. And now the situation in north-west Tunisia is taking a turn for the worse, prompting the Algerian authorities to close the border with Tunisia too.
    Back in December of last year, armed islamists clashed with the Tunisian gendarmerie in Djebel Chaambi, near Kasserine, close to the Algerian border, killing one gendarme and wounding three others. Eleven days later, the Tunisian Interior Minister announced that a training camp “run by three Algerians close to AQMI leader Abou Mossaâb Abdelouadoud” had been discovered in the area; some 16 armed islamists, among them three Libyans, had been arrested, and another 18 were still at large. The jihadist groups were not stamped out, however, and in late April the Tunisian military began a more concerted campaign against the armed groups in Djebel Chaambi and a smaller group further north in Djebel Salloum, also situated along the border. More than a dozen members of the Tunisian national guard and army were wounded, some of them severely, in the first half of May by landmines laid by the group to protect their encampments. 
    Publicly, Tunisian officials say the Djebel Chaambi group numbers no more than 20, a good half of them Algerian. Speaking to us in private, a Tunisian government security official estimated the number of terrorists in the Djebel Chaambi area at “200 individuals of various nationalities, but mostly from northern Mali and Libya”. Tunisian officials have suggested that the armed groups want to use the heavily wooded and inaccessible borderlands as a base for attacks elsewhere, perhaps on targets in Algeria, and although there has been no official confirmation that jihadist groups in north-west Tunisia have launched cross-border raids, it is worth recalling an unusual incident in the north-eastern Algerian wilaya of Khenchela in February, in which by some accounts as many as 50 jihadists, “most of them Tunisians and Libyans”, attempted to storm an Algerian army camp. 
    At the end of April, Gen. Rachid Ammar, chief of staff of the Tunisian armed forces, accompanied PM Ali Laarayedh on a visit to Algiers, during which they met with Gen. Ammar’s opposite number, Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd-Saleh. Flowing from this, a direct line of communication between ground and air operations in Algeria and Tunisia was reportedly set up to facilitate the exchange of information between the security services, while the Algerians presented their plans for expanded aerial surveillance along their eastern border to prevent the infiltration of armed groups as well as weapons smuggling across Tunisia from Libya[7]. By mid-May, the Algerian army had reportedly deployed more than 6,000 troops on the Tunisian border (eight brigades of regular troops and special forces).
    The Tunisian government security official quoted above argues that what the Tunisian and Algerian armies are fighting in north-west Tunisia is:
    the military wing of a broader Salafist-Jihadist movement spanning Tunisian mosques, whose membership is estimated at 35,000 to 40,000. […] In addition to their base camps in the mountains, their activities include recruitment, propaganda and fundraising in mosques. We are in a situation similar to that of Algeria in the early 90s — except that Tunisia is ill prepared to deal with it. Security officials have asked their political superiors to activate the security treaty signed with Algeria in 1983 and the Algerians have replied favourably. They closed their borders and put their intelligence resources (human and technological) at Tunisia’s disposal, but that appears to be insufficient and there is a request underway for Algeria to extend the terms of the 1983 treaty to include cooperation in personnel and materiel. To put it bluntly, we want the Algerians to send us units and equipment to control the whole mountainous border area. The Tunisian army lacks the necessary equipment (anti-mine gear, night-vision, infrared sights, etc), and what it has is old and not serviceable. As soon as the Algerians take charge of the border areas, Tunisian army and security forces units will take care of Salafist-Jihadists inside the country. In addition to the shortage of equipment, Tunisian forces are hampered by a wobbly political class and the lack of a firm grip on domestic threats. It is likely the jihadists will seek revenge for the army’s operations in Djebel Chaambi by carrying out attacks in the cities. The political class and civil society organisations appear to underestimate the threat. 
    If such pessimistic forecasts to the east are even partly confirmed, sections of the Algerian establishment – and notably of the military – are likely to find themselves all the more inclined to appreciate the relative stability of their western neighbour in the coming period.

  • May Algerie monthly report (2/4)

    Political Trends

    On April 27, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was airlifted to the Val de Grâce military hospital in Paris after suffering a “transient ischemia” – a temporary blockage of a blood vessel often called a mini-stroke. “The President is in very good health,” his doctor Rachid Bougherbal told the press after the news was announced, adding that the President would return to Algiers “in not more than seven days.” Almost four weeks later, there has still been no sign of Bouteflika and only the scantest of official communications about his condition, and speculation about his real state of health and its political consequences is mounting to fever pitch. 
    One of the earliest rumours had to do with the causes of the President’s cerbrovascular accident. On the very day of his evacuation to Paris, Le Quotidien d’Oran ran a report, widely taken up by other Algerian media, quoting “certain sources close to the presidential circle” as claiming that the stroke occurred after Bouteflika learnt that his influential brother Saïd had been implicated in corruption scandals currently being investigated by the DRS intelligence and security service, forcing the President to dismiss him as an advisor. This story may well be apocryphal – we have had no confirmation from sources at the Presidency that Saïd Bouteflika has been sacked, and an Algerian businessman with family ties to the nomenklatura has expressed doubt that the President would even be capable of such a move, such is the “fusional” relationship between the two brothers – but it is symptomatic of the tense climate generated by the corruption investigations and of the uncertainty that they are generating.
    In our last report, we noted claims in specialist newsletter Maghreb Confidentiel to the effect that Maj-Gen. Bachir Tartag, head of internal security at the DRS, had deliberately orchestrated the corruption investigations in order to “smash the fragile peace between his boss Tewfik[1] and the head of state, cause the Bouteflika clan to implode and prevent the President from running for a fourth term in 2014”. In the absence of confirmation from other sources, we suggested that such claims were nonetheless worth monitoring and testing against the facts as they unfolded. Evidence has since been mounting that the corruption investigations are indeed closely linked to the succession question.
    At least two sources have, over the past month, suggested that – contrary to the 2009-10 crackdown on graft, which appears to have been driven by Bouteflika himself – this time the anti-corruption campaign is very much driven by the DRS. According to a project manager at Sonatrach who has had contact with current and former DRS officers involved in the corruption investigations:
    The DRS says it is concerned about foreign investigations into Algerian affairs: the FBI has opened a preliminary investigation, the British suspect a BVI-registered subsidiary of Sonatrach of tax fraud, the Canadians have begun proceedings against SNC-Lavalin for corruption in its contracts with Sonatrach. But the DRS’ concern is only a pretext, the aim of which is to demonstrate to Bouteflika and his entourage the need to launch a wide-ranging inquiry targeting people close to the President, which could affect him personally. The DRS has been piling on the pressure, instrumentalising this inquiry and the fight against corruption in general to settle two fast-approaching successions: Bouteflika’s and Tewfik’s. For this reason, the inquiry has become a major issue for the DRS. 
    An official at El Mouradia presidential palace adds further detail to the picture:
    Contrary to what has been said in some quarters, Tartag has been chosen by Tewfik, against Bouteflika’s will, as his successor at the head of the DRS.
    The Presidency is mobilising all its resources to keep track of the investigation into corruption at Sonatrach. The DRS has been putting out some worrying signals, and the Presidency is not being kept informed of how the investigation is proceeding. The President is being kept out of the loop, supposedly so as to “spare” him. Aside from the President himself, the DRS is eavesdropping on everybody at the Presidency, where the atmosphere has been toxic since December. 
    Given the prevailing mood in relations between the Presidency and the DRS due to the tug-of-war over the succesion, corruption investigations could go on for months. Tewfik has put people who are close to him in charge of these investigations: aside from Tartag, you also have Generals Gobrini and Djebbar. Virtually all the top brass of the DRS are taken up with the succession question, and the corruption investigations are one symptom of this amongst others. Tewfik’s men want to use these investigations to raise the pressure and force Bouteflika to submit to their will: no fourth term. Tewfik has said that “we’ll settle Bouteflika’s succession first”, implying that he himself will also go once he has taken care of Bouteflika’s succesion. 
    There are at least four points that are worth drawing out of this. Firstly, it would appear that, while he is certainly involved in overseeing the corruption investigations as head of the Directorate of Internal Security, Gen. Tartag is neither the sole driver of the campaign nor acting against Tewfik, but with him. Secondly, the sources seem to believe that Tewfik, who is now 72 and whose health may no longer be what it was, is contemplating his own departure at some point in the future[2]. Thirdly, for the first time in years, it is seriously suggested that Tewfik is not acting in tandem with Bouteflika. And finally, the corruption investigations have a clear political objective: to make it impossible for Bouteflika to stand for a fourth successive term of office.
    In mid-April, it will be recalled, a source with access to both Bouteflika and Tewfik suggested guardedly that Bouteflika had, after months of hesitation, finally made up his mind to stand for a fourth term, while remaining coy as to other players’ stances on this decision. The matter may now have been settled by Bouteflika’s health issues, however. Over the past week, press reports have been increasingly pessimistic: on May 17, French newsmagazine Le Point quoted “concordant” Algerian and French sources as suggesting that the President’s condition
    when he was admitted to Val-de-Grâce was far worse than stated in the official announcement and that “certain vital functions are badly affected”, and on May 19, Algerian French-language daily Mon Journal and its Arabic-language sister publication Jaridati claimed that Boutflika, suffering from cancer as well as immunodeficiency and metabolic problems, had been secretly flown back to Algeria in a coma four days previously[3]. On May 21, French daily Le Parisien quoted a member of the French government as saying that Bouteflika had been transferred from Val-de-Grâce to the Institution Nationale des Invalides, another French military hospital that specialises in treating the war-wounded and the severely handicapped, for “convalescence” (which was later partially confirmed by the French Defence Ministry). 
    To be sure, the official version – as expressed by Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and presidential advisor Farouk Ksentini – remains that Bouteflika the President, “whose life was never in danger and whose health is improving day by day” is resting at his doctors’ insistence but nonetheless “continues to follow the daily operations of government, pending his return to continue his mission in the service of Algeria and the nation”. This is essentially the same line as we had been given, in private, by a staffer at El Mouradia presidential palace since the beginning of Bouteflika’s hospitalisation: the President had suffered a very minor stroke which was by no means life-threatening and had been promptly dealt with, and had been told to rest by his doctors; speaking to us again on May 15, the same source claimed that Bouteflika had made a full recovery and had been due to return that very day, but had postponed “for 24 hours” (the source ventured no explanation for this). But the longer Bouteflika’s return is postponed, the less convincing such reassurances sound.
    Thus, even if Bouteflika is not physically dying, his political death seems increasingly probable. It is telling that – in contrast with his previous hospitalisation at Val-de-Grâce in November 2005 (for a bleeding ulcer), when gushing messages wishing him a speedy recovery and a swift return to his position at the helm of the state were de rigueur for almost all mainstream politicians and parties – Algeria’s political class, and in particular the two main government parties, the RND and the FLN, have this time remained entirely silent throughout his hospitalisation. As if uncertain of what is expected of them, party leaders have been refusing to make the slightest comment on the matter to the press. This is far from the reaction one might have expected had the fourth term been a ‘done deal’ within the ruling establishment. Even more explicitly, former Navy Commander Gen. Mohand Tahar Yala, who last year founded a political grouping he calls the Citizenship Movement, on May 19 penned a violent attack on Bouteflika that was published by Algerian daily El Watan and news portal Algérie Focus, in which he accuses the President of “high treason” for his role in establishing a “predatory” system of corruption that has wasted and pillaged Algeria’s wealth[4] and calls for him to be removed from office immediately[5]. 
    If, on the other hand, Bouteflika’s condition really is as bad as has been suggested, the ruling establishment – and in particular Tewfik and the other senior officers of the DRS, together perhaps with the tops of the military – will have had time to prepare for his disappearance and deal with its consequences. Indeed, if our sources are correct when they suggest that the DRS top brass have been actively striving to prevent Bouteflika running for a fourth term, the most awkward scenario for Tewfik et al might, paradoxically, be for Bouteflika to make a full recovery as promised and return in fighting form.

  • May Algerie monthly situation report (1/4)

     

    ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

    Executive Summary

    Political Trends

    ·     Almost a month after he was airlifted to Paris for treatment following a “minor stroke”, there has been no sign of President Bouteflika and speculation as to his condition is rising to fever pitch.

    ·      Bouteflika’s health problems come just as he had made up his mind to run for a fourth successive term of office next year.

    ·      Concordant sources suggest that one of the main aims of the corruption investigations, which are being driven by the DRS, is to prevent Bouteflika from running for a fourth term.

    ·     The question of the fourth term may have been laid to rest by the President’s health problems; paradoxically, the situation may become more complicated if Bouteflika were to make a full recovery and return in fighting form .

    Foreign Relations

    ·     Interior Minister Ould Kablia has announced new security measures along the border with Morocco, and complained bitterly of the Moroccan authorities’ lack of cooperation in combatting smuggling.

    ·      Inclined for domestic political reasons to talk up problems on the border with Morocco, Ould Kablia has tended to downplay far greater threats on Algeria’s eastern borders.

    ·      As they move against jihadist groups in the mountains along the border with Algeria, the Tunisian authorities are appealing for ever greater military assistance from the Algerians.

    ·     A Tunisian security official draws a pessimistic prognosis for the situation in Tunisia, which is compared to Algeria in the early ’90s.

    Security

    ·     Jihadist activity nationwide accelerated markedly in April and early May, with security operations lagging somewhat behind them. There were no incidents in Algiers, however.

    ·      A convoy of Italian expatriate workers has been ambushed in north-west Algeria in what may have been a kidnapping attempt, although none were taken hostage or wounded.

    ·      Repeated acts of car-jacking and brigandry in the Hassi Messaoud area indicate that security is still not optimal around Algeria’s oldest oil hub.

    ·     There have been a number of incursions in the south-eastern oil province of Illizi by small groups of armed men from Libya, including one near In Amenas, and a failed attack on a security  forces convoy transporting jihadist prisoners in the same province.