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  • November Algeria report (2/4)

     

    Political Trends

    The surprise attack on the Sonatrach-BP-Statoil gas facility at In Amenas in the southern Algerian province of Illizi on January 16 is a unique and unprecedented event: not only does it represent the first direct attack on hydrocarbons production facilities in Algeria since the islamist insurgency broke out 21 years ago, it is without a doubt the worst terrorist incident at an oil or gas installation anywhere in the world in the history of the industry. With Minister of Communication Mohand Oussaïd Belaïd now casting it as “Algeria’s 9/11”, it is worth considering how the In Amenas siege might affect relations and the balance of power between the key members of the country’s leadership – President Bouteflika, intelligence chief Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène and the heads of the army – all the more so in light of earlier claims that Tewfik had been unsettled to see Western powers dealing primarily with CoS Lt-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd-Saleh rather than him when discussing how to handle crisis in northern Mali[1], to which of course the In Amenas attack is linked.

    The public blame game following the In Amenas attack has naturally been more muted than it might have been in a fully functioning democracy, with the result that indicators as to how the incident is affecting relations at the top are partial, fragmentary, and to some extent contradictory. On the one hand, while local and international news media (and the Algerian Defence Ministry’s own website) have tended to highlight the role of the army’s special forces in putting an end to the In Amenas hostage crisis[2], a source close to the commanders of the DRS intelligence and security service tells us that President Bouteflika from the outset entrusted control over operations to the DRS, which kept the President informed throughout. This would seem to imply that, behind the scenes, Tewfik has the upper hand over the military chiefs, while at the same time holding onto an important card in his relationship with Bouteflika insofar as he is entrusted with the task of channelling critical information to the President.

    On the other hand, the Algerian press has in general been very supportive of the army’s role, with most media strongly defending both the refusal to negotiate with the armed group that had seized control of the site and the uncompromising military assault that put an end to the siege, and to the extent that there has been any questioning in the Algerian media, it has tended largely to focus on how the attack could have happened in the first place – the unspoken charge being that In Amenas could only have occurred because of a catastrophic intelligence failure. In this vein, leading Arabic-language daily Al-Khabar (Jan. 21) claims that President Bouteflika had ordered an investigation into how AQMI was able to take over the In Amenas facility. This of course lays the blame implicitly at the door of the DRS. Meanwhile, a source at the Presidency has been hinting that Tewfik is no longer the pivotal figure he once was. If this is so, it may be the result of a longer-term decline in power rather than a direct consequence of the In Amenas episode, but insinuations about his services’ lack of efficacy in defending the country’s vital infrastructures against terrorist attack will do nothing to enhance Tewfik’s standing.

    At the same time, there has been open criticism, especially in the Algerian French-language and online media, of Bouteflika’s role, or rather his absence, during and after the In Amenas crisis. Having received Malian Prime Minister Diango Cissoko on Jan. 14, two days before AQMI’s attack on the In Amenas facility, Bouteflika disappeared from public view for a full fortnight, reappearing on Jan. 28 to welcome the Spanish Defence Minister. Bouteflika’s failure to address the nation at the height or in the immediate aftermath of the crisis was seen as a sign of “contempt” for the people by some press commentators, while others suggested that the President had not been seen or heard because he was in Geneva for medical treatment[3]. This latter explanation – a recurrent rumour – appears to be untrue: a senior civil servant at the Presidency tells us that Bouteflika is “in good health” and had not of late been noticeably absent from the El Mouradia presidential palace[4]. Indeed, however much criticism might be piled upon him beyond the walls of El Mouradia, within the inner workings of the Algerian political system Bouteflika still seems to be in control.

    Above all, the President appears to have the upper hand with regard to the upcoming presidential contest – more so, it would seem, than intelligence chief Tewfik, who had previously been held to be the king-maker. One source at the Presidency suggests, almost off-handedly, that the current most likely candidate to take over from Bouteflika in 2014 is Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal – a long-standing and reliable supporter of Bouteflika who is also understood to be close to Tewfik, but who has not hitherto been thought of as having either the ambition or the stature to become President. At the same time, however, the option of Bouteflika himself standing for a fourth successive term of office has still not be been definitively rul
    ed out, and it seems unlikely that any firm decision will be possible at least until the dust has settled from In Amenas, and possibly not before there is clearer visibility with regard to the implications for Algeria of the broader conflict in northern Mali.

  • November Algeria report (1/4)

     

    ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

    February 8, 2013

                         Executive Summary

                            Political Trends

    ·     Although there have been suggestions that DRS commander Tewfik may no longer be as pivotal a player as he once was, the DRS is understood to have been put in command of operations at the In Amenas siege and to have responsibility for channelling critical information to President Bouteflika.

    ·     The press has been strongly supportive of the army’s intervention at In Amenas, but has implicitly questioned the possible shortcomings of the DRS in preventing the terrorist take-over of the gas facility, which may be damaging for Tewfik.

    ·     Rumours that Bouteflika was in Geneva for medical treatment during the In Amenas crisis appear to be untrue. The President is reported to be in good health and the main arbiter in the forthcoming presidential contest.

    ·     Although the possibility of Bouteflika himself running for a 4th term of office has still not been ruled out, PM Abdelmalek Sellal is now being mentioned as a possible successor.

                            Foreign Relations

    ·     The In Amenas attack was launched in retaliation for Algeria’s assistance to the French war effort in northern Mali, which includes efforts to cut off AQMI’s access to fuel as well as authorising French air force overflights.

    ·     The In Amenas attack and the earlier islamist offensive in Mali initially put the Algerian regime on the back foot, stoking its fears of losing all control over the Sahara, exposing its collaboration with France and putting its relations with countries whose nationals were among the hostages under strain.

    ·     Algiers appears however to be bouncing back, earning respect for its tough response, securing a security cooperation agreement with the UK and pressing for transfers of sensitive military and security technology.

                            Security

    ·     The In Amenas crisis dominated reporting of security news in January, possibly crowding out other incidents.

    ·     In Amenas was the first ever direct attack on oil and gas production facilities in Algeria since the outbreak of violence in 1992.

    ·     The opportunistic attempt by AQMI and its allies to build an ‘Islamic emirate’ in northern Mali brought them into direct conflict with France, transforming AQMI’s strategic orientation and recasting Mokhtar Belmokhtar as the new face of the global jihad.

    ·     The attacks of AQMI’s Saharan branch on Algerian interests are subsidiary to its struggle with France, but it remains to be seen whether or not the national leadership in the north of the country will adopt this orientation.

  • November Algeria report (4/4)

     

    Security

    The level of jihadist activity continued to decline in October, and slumped heavily in November.  Only three AQMI operations were reported in November, down from ten in October and 13 in September, making it the quietest month Algeria has seen in several years in terms of jihadist activity. The reason for the abrupt fall in AQMI activity in November is most likely the inclement weather that hit northern Algeria in the middle of the month, but the clear downward trend we have observed over the past few months still holds. AQMI operations remain small-scale – roadside bombs and isolated shootings – and mostly concentrated in Kabylia: eight out of ten in October and all three of the attacks in November took place in the Kabyle wilayas to the east of Algiers. The level of army activity, meanwhile, has remained steady throughout the period from August to November, at around 10 operations per month, although the municipal and provincial elections on Nov. 29 did see a special mobilisation of the security forces (notably the police, with 76,000 men detailed to protecting the 27,000 polling stations across the country).

    In ALGIERS the security forces on November 9 detained “two armed men, suspected of being terrorists” at a checkpoint between Zeralda and Ben Aknoun, to the west of the capital.  The two men reportedly “tried to resist” and “an ambulance was called to the location” though “no shots were heard,” said El-Khabar (10/11).

    The oil producing areas of the south were largely quiet, as were the southern borders, which saw no incidents after the three reported early October (see previous report).  The Algerian press has persistently been reporting heightened security along the country’s southern borders, especially with Mali, with Al-Khabar (05/11) indicating that the Algerian army “has begun deploying a 50km-long electrified fence along the borders with Mali around the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar” to block access for “terrorists and smugglers” (although this would still leave about 1,100km of unguarded border between Algeria and Mali). On Nov. 4, according to Al-Khabar (04/11) security forces “arrested a  terrorist from Niger carrying a suicide belt near the Libyan border, Daraj sector, inside Algerian territory”.  The man admitted he was a member of MUJAO and was planning a suicide attack against Algerian security targets in the southern wilayas.   The Algerian press later reported that as many as 61 people (29 Malians, 18 Algerians and 14 people from other countries including Nigeria and Burkina Faso) were arrested in Tamanrasset on Nov. 23-24 on suspicion of contacts with terrorist groups in Mali, notably MUJAO; only four were reportedly charged with supporting terrorism, however.

    The Libyan border, meanwhile, saw some incidents.  The security forces around October 21 intercepted a Libyan armed group that had crossed into Algerian territory near In Amenas (wilaya of Illizi).  The group, believed to be composed of a Libyan rebel commander and his armed escort, is thought to have been in Algeria to meet with weapons smugglers in the desert and close a deal.  The Algerian security forces tracked the commander and arrested him some 200km south of Debdeb.  On October 31 the army intercepted six smugglers near the Libyan border in the Djanet area (also in the wilaya of Illizi) and seized two offroaders and a quantity of weapons and ammunition believed to have been on the way to deliver to jihadists in northern Mali.  On Oct. 28 Al-Khabar published a somewhat confused account of uncertain credibility of an AQMI emir arrested near the Libyan border while trying to racketeer a shepherd and who told the security forces during interrogation about stocks MANPADS smuggled from Libya and hidden somewhere on Algerian territory.

    END

    Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel

    President and CEO

    The Gabriel Company, LLC

    1220 L Street NW, Suite 411

    Washington DC, 20005

    Phone: +1 202.887.1113

    Fax:     +1 202.887.1115

    Email:  ed.gabriel@thegabrielco.com

    Website: http://thegabrielco.com 


    [1]     See AMSR #118

    [2]     Benflis served as Prime Minister for three years during Bouteflika’s first term, becoming General Secretary of the FLN in 2003. Having fallen out with Bouteflika he stood as the FLN candidate in the 2004 presidential election, and for a time appeared well set to beat him with the Army’s tacit approval, but appears to have been robbed of his victory by a last minute deal between Bouteflika and Tewfik, which led to the lasting political marginalisation of the Army chiefs and, in its wake, a coup against him within the FLN – led by Abdelaziz Belkhadem.

    [4]     “Our orchard has ripened”, i.e. the younger generation is ready to take over from the generation that fought in the war of independence. See AMSR#114.

    [5]     A former DRS officer points out, however, that DRS chief Tewfik is unsettled by the fact that the West’s main interlocutor with Algeria on the situation in northern Mali is not him but Chief of Staff Maj-Gen. Ahmed Gaïd-Saleh.

    [6]    Ansar Dine may not have actually broken with AQMI and MUJAO on the ground in northern Mali itself, however. Ansar Dine’s core objective appears to be less the establishment of sharia law than establishing and perpetuating Iyad Ag Ghaly’s dominance over the Tuareg Iforas clan and the Kidal region, and it is increasingly clear that it is quite flexible – not to say opportunistic – in pursuing that goal.

  • November Algeria report (3/4)

     

    Foreign Relations

     

    If the situation in Mali and the Sahel is impinging on the calculations made at the top of the Algerian state with regard to the 2014 presidential election, it is because it is becoming increasingly clear that the crisis set in motion by the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali in the first months of 2012 will not be short-lived. On the contrary, despite the best efforts of various concerned parties – the Malian government, ECOWAS, France, the United Nations – to set deadlines and timetables for ‘solving’ the north Mali crisis, the real time scale for any kind of meaningful action keeps stretching further and further into the future. In accordance with UNSC Resolution 2071, passed in mid-October, ECOWAS duly convened on Nov. 11 to approve military intervention by its member states’ armed forces, with the support of Western powers, and France is now pushing hard for a new UNSC resolution approving this, to be voted on it is hoped in mid-December. France and other EU states, including Germany and it is thought Great Britain, are already involved in discussions of the practicalities of military intervention with ECOWAS governments. But in contrast to the bold prognoses made by French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in the early autumn, according to which a military intervention was then only “a matter of weeks” away, there is a growing realisation that it will take at least six months to equip and prepare the ECOWAS force and plan its mission properly; at the UN and in military-to-military discussions, the United States appears to be urging greater caution and an even longer time scale, on the grounds that the 3,500 men promised by ECOWAS will simply not be sufficient to take on the job. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, reporting to the Security Council at the end of November, has expressed the view that, while military action may ultimately be necessary against the “most extremist” elements in northern Mali, any such intervention requires far more preparation if a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe is to be averted, and that in the meantime “political dialogue” must be given pride of place.

    Tactically speaking, this is to the advantage of Algiers, which, while vacillating somewhat on the rights and wrongs of the principle of military intervention against the hard core AQMI and MUJAO in northern Mali, has consistently foregrounded dialogue with those rebel groups that can be engaged as the best way forward – an approach which enables the Algerians, and in particular the DRS[5], to leverage their extensive knowledge of and contacts in northern Mali. And indeed the Algerian authorities have lost no time in initiating talks with both the Tuareg separatist MNLA and the islamist Ansar Dine, both in Algiers and in Ouagadougou (under the auspices of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, ECOWAS’ designated mediator). Superficially at least, this approach seems to have borne fruit remarkably quickly. MNLA spokesmen have made concessions on the group’s central demand of independence, claiming that a form of autonomy within a federation may be acceptable, and have engaged the hardcore islamist MUJAO in battle in the Gao region as of mid-November. Spokesmen for Ansar Dine, meanwhile, have claimed[6] that the organisation has “broken with terrorism” and enjoys “very good relations” with the MNLA, and renounced the goal of conquering the whole of Mali to establish sharia law across the entire country; furthermore, the group has on at least one occasion intercepted cigarette smugglers in the Malian desert who are believed to have been raising funds on behalf of AQMI and/or MUJAO. Gratifyingly for the Algerian authorities, Cheikh Awisa, one of Ansar Dine’s political and military leaders, has recently stated that the organisation insists that any “decisive solution” must be “found and signed in Algiers.”

    In this context, as forecast in our last report, the differences between the French and Algerian positions are again becoming increasingly visible, even as French President François Hollande’s visit to Algiers approaches. Questioned by reporters in Paris on Nov. 20, Hollande continued to foreground the military solution and categorically ruled out any talks with “groups linked with terrorism” (which, by French definitions, ought to encompass Ansar Dine); speaking at the same time on Algerian radio, Algerian Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia laid out a diametrically opposite position, insisting that “trying to reconstitute Mali’s territorial unity by force would be an adventure that will never succeed.”

    Hollande is due to visit Algiers in mid-December, around the time the Security Council meets to approve the ECOWAS intervention plan. This in itself does not bode well for efforts to build a new entente between France and Algeria – all the more so given that the slight advantage Algiers may have felt it had acquired vis à vis Morocco, France’s traditional partner in the Maghreb, appears to be evaporating. After six months of silence on the question following the election of the new centre-left government, Paris has reaffirmed its support for the Moroccan autonomy plan in for Western Sahara, while Rabat has finally appointed a new ambassador to Paris in the person of Chakib Benmoussa (former Interior Minister and one-time chief negotiator at the Manhasset talks), putting an end to rumours of a “silent crisis” in Franco-Moroccan relations. A visit to Rabat by Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault accompanied by several members of his government has been scheduled for December 12-13, just before Hollande’s trip to Algiers, as if to reassure the Moroccans of the continuity of their ‘special relationship’ with Paris. And in the meantime, rumours have begun to crop up in the Moroccan press to the effect that the contribution of Moroccan special forces has been solicited for the forthcoming northern Mali operation (according to one version, by Hollande himself, during the summit of French-speaking nations in Kinshasa in October, with the offer of debt forgivenes
    s as an incentive). While these reports remain for the time being unconfirmed, they can scarcely be reassuring for Algiers, for whom recognising that Morocco has a legitimate interest in the Sahara-Sahel region would in effect amount to recognising Rabat’s claim to Western Sahara.

  • November Algeria report (2/4)

     

    Political Trends

     On Nov. 29, Algerians went to the polls for the second time this year, this time to elect municipal and provincial councils. As is now usual, the election was greeted with indifference and cynicism by large swathes of the population – with the added disincentives, this time round, of torrential rain in many areas and, in the Béjaïa region, two moderately sized earthquakes. Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia nonetheless announced a turnout of 44.26% – very slightly higher than the turnout in the last local elections in 2007, and very close (many would say suspiciously close) to the forecast Ould Kablia himself had made two days previously. As usual, according to the official results, the FLN came out on top, with the RND not very far behind. Also as usual, there have been claims of fraud and ballot rigging by officials, which have been dismissed by the Interior Ministry.

     True to form if not to reality, official news agency APS proclaimed the local elections “another step forward in strengthening democracy”. Those interested in the path the Algerian state is really taking, however, will have been looking to other, more meaningful events on the political calendar. On the one hand, there is the process of constitutional reform – as promised in President Bouteflika’s famous televised address of April 2011, in the midst of the first wave of the “Arab spring”. Ould Kablia announced on Nov. 21 that the ball is to be set rolling in the coming weeks with the appointment of a commission to draft proposed amendments to the constitution; the commission’s recommendations will be discussed by the government, perhaps in the second quarter of 2013 according to Ould Kablia, before being submitted for approval either by parliament or by referendum. And on the other hand, there is the presidential election – now less than a year and a half away.

     Over the past few months, we have watched the fortunes of a number of possible contenders for the presidency unfold – or, perhaps, unwind. FLN leader Abdelaziz Belkhadem’s ambitions, it will be recalled, were an open secret, but his chances have been badly damaged by the open revolt against his leadership which has been festering within his party for months now. At the same time, RND leader Ahmed Ouyahia, long thought to have been DRS chief Mohamed Tewfik Médiène’s favoured candidate to succeed Bouteflika, seems to have been pushed into the background, especially since he was replaced as Prime Minister at the beginning of September. More recently, there had been some speculation that Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul, who this autumn set up his new party, the TAJ, apparently with the connivance of the authorities, was perhaps being groomed as a docile successor to Bouteflika – the skeletons in his closet from the corruption-ridden episode of the East-West motorway project making him all the easier for the DRS to control[1]. In mid-November, however, French-language daily Algérie News began to bring those skeletons out into the public eye, printing revelations of bribe-taking in connection with the East-West motorway project, implicating not only Ghoul, but also Belkhadem and Industry Minister Cherif Rahmani. The daily claimed to be in possession of “confidential files” and hinted that more revelations were to come, which suggests that it may have been fed the compromising information by the DRS, or elements within it, in a deliberate move to puncture any presidential ambitions Ghoul may have been harbouring. A former DRS officer and one-time presidential advisor says that Ghoul is now “toast” and Belkhadem marginalised, and confirms that the waning of Ouyahia’s star followed a serious falling-out between him and Tewfik.

     The same former DRS officer went on to claim that Tewfik is now grooming Ali Benflis, Bouteflika’s unlucky challenger in the 2004 presidential election, to succeed him in the 2014 poll, describing Benflis as the “dominant figure” now within the FLN[2]. Interestingly, some days after the source made this claim in a private conversation, leading Arabic-language daily Al-Khabar (27/11/12) published an account of a meeting Ali Benflis had purportedly convened at his family home with a number of leading members of the FLN to announce his intention of running for president in 2014, now that he had received “assurances” that Bouteflika would not be standing for a fourth term of office due to ill-health. Benflis is reported to have phoned Al-Khabar with a denial the same day, but the former FLN Secretary General is nonetheless clearly a man to watch over the coming months.

     As it happens, same issue of Al-Khabar carried, on the page opposite the article on Ali Benflis’ alleged presidential bid, a full-page advertisement paid for by millionaire member of parliament for Annaba Bahaeddine Tliba[3], beseeching President Bouteflika to run for a fourth term of office in 2014. While it is conceivable that this is no more than a personal initiative of Tliba’s, it is worth remembering that pseudo-spontaneous appeals for an ostensibly reluctant head of state to reconsider h
    is supposed plans for retirement have long been a set-piece of pre-electoral periods in autocratic republics across the Arab world. And while Bouteflika did seem to be signalling his readiness to bow out when he gave his now famous “tab djenanena”[4] speech in Setif in May of this year, there has been mounting speculation that he may not be ready to give up the presidency yet after all. Indeed, the same ex-DRS source cited above suggests that u    ntil recently, Bouteflika was in two minds about running again in 2014, though his family had been urging him to do so, but may now be inclined to stay on for a fourth term of office because of developments in Mali and the South: in the turmoil that is afflicting the region and threatening Algeria itself, Bouteflika would, it is argued, be a symbol of the stability and continuity of the Algerian state.

  • November Algeria report (1/4)

     ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

    November 30, 2012

                          

                         Executive Summary

                            Political Trends

    ·     The municipal and provincial elections have passed off amid the usual indifference.

    ·     Interior Minister Ould Kablia has indicated that the process of constitutional reform should begin soon with the appointment of a commission in charge of drafting amendments.

    ·     At least three figures previously identified as possible successors to Bouteflika – former Prime Ministers Ahmed Ouyahia and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul – seem for various reasons to be out of the running for the 2014 presidential election.

    ·     Ali Benflis, Bouteflika’s unlucky challenger in 2004, may now be emerging as a serious contender, possibly enjoying the support of DRS chief Tewfik.

    ·     On the other hand, the regime’s need for stability and continuity may mean that President Bouteflika will run for a fourth term of office after all.

                            Foreign Relations

    ·     Despite the ECOWAS resolution approving military action, there will be no quick solution to the crisis in northern Mali. At least six months’ preparation are thought to be necessary for an military intervention, once it has been okayed by the UNSC in mid-December.

    ·     Algiers has been restating its opposition to military “adventures” in northern Mali, and has been engaging the Ansar Dine and MNLA rebel groups in dialogue, with at least superfical success.

    ·     As French President François Hollande’s visit to Algeria draws near, differences between Algiers and Paris on the way forward in northern Mali are thus increasingly open.

    ·     Algiers will not be reassured by an apparent warming of relations between France and Morocco, amid unconfirmed reports that Paris has sought the participation of Moroccan special forces in any military operation to reconquer northern Mali.

                            Security

    ·     Jihadist activity has continued to decline, dropping to particularly low levels in November.

    ·      Although there was one minor incident in Algiers, the bulk of jihadist activity has been recorded in AQMI’s heartland in Kabylia.

    ·     There have been sporadic incidents, mostly involving suspected gun-runners on Algeria’s southern borders, notably with Libya.

    ·     Towards the end of November, security forces rounded up over 60 suspected sympathisers of MUJAO in the Wilaya of Tamanrasset.

  • October Algeria report (Part IV)

    Security

    Levels of jihadist activity and related security incidents were somewhat below average in September: only 13 jihadist operations were recorded (down from 15 the previous month and 19 the month before that), out of a total incident count of 23. AQMI’s traditional heartland Kabylia has been particularly quiet: only one terrorism-related incident was reported in the Kabyle wilayas for the whole month between Aug. 13 and Sept. 13[6], and although AQMI activity resumed in Kabylia after that date it remained at a surprisingly low level, with only 8 operations reported for September and the first week of October. Algerian newspapers reported that security forces in the town of Tizi Ouzou, the largest city in Kabylia, were put on “maximum alert” on October 5 after intelligence services received “credible information” of a suicide car bomb “ready to go” in the town, but there does not appear to have been any follow-through. The question of whether AQMI’s capability in its historic heartland has been lastingly degraded, raised in our last report, remains open.
    In ALGIERS, meanwhile, the situation was entirely quiet apart from one incident on Sept. 13 when the authorities destroyed a “suspect package” in the Baïnem forest on the western edges of the capital. A local resident spotted the object and alerted the authorities who cordoned off the area and brought in the bomb squad. The object was destroyed in a controlled explosion and its fragments taken to the lab for inspection. It is not clear, though, whether it was a actually bomb. 
    While the oil- and gas-producing regions of the SOUTH were on the whole quiet, activity and clashes with smugglers on the borders resumed after a four-month hiatus (see previous report). Only two armed clashes on the southern borders were reported from May 23 to September 12, and seven since, including two firefights with smugglers/jihadists around the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar on the border with Mali, one incident with “jihadists coming in from Libya” near the town of Deb Deb in Illizi, a clash with smugglers south of Djanet on the border with Libya, and a clash “near the border with Niger”. On Oct. 6 special forces units “on the border with Mali” captured “four Mujao jihadists” — three originally from Niger and one Algerian — “using advanced sensing devices brought in from Russia”. The jihadists were trying to sneak their way in among a group of refugees fleeing instability in northern Mali, but they were discovered. They were found to be carrying individual weapons and “an explosive belt”. The next day (Oct. 7) an army force clashed with a group of jihadists of the Belmokhtar group that were trying to cross into Algerian near Tinzaouatin on the Malian border. The army “destroyed an offroader and killed four jihadist”. Further, L’Expression reported on October 9 that the recent dismantling of a “terror support” network in the east of the country has allowed the authorities to seize “SAM-7 missiles[7] smuggled in from Libya”. The newspaper gave no further details, but this “revelation” came a couple of weeks after the commander of a powerful Libyan militia told the Washington Post (Sept. 24) that looters had stolen “a large number” of shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles (manpads) from the militia’s base in Benghazi when protesters who called for dismantling the country’s militias overran the compound. It is worth recalling here that the Algerian press has frequently talked of manpads seized by the authorities on the borders or smuggled into the country, but on the ground there is no firm evidence that Aqmi in Algeria itself has such weapons.
    Across the border in northern Mali, Aqmi’s “emir of the Sahara region”, Nabil Makhloufi (aka, Abou Alqama, an Algerian national) was killed “in a car accident” north of Gao on September 8, according to reports on Mauritanian news sites, later confirmed by Aqmi itself. On October 4 ANI, a Mauritanian news agency, said Jemal Oukacha, alias Yahya Abou El Hammam, a close aid to Aqmi Emir Abdelmalik Droukdel, was named the group’s emir for the Sahara region. Abou El Hammam, an Algerian national, is one of the most prominent Al-Qaeda leaders in northern Mali, and was earlier this year appointed “governor of Timbuktu” by the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance which currently controls northern Mali.
    The news of Abou Alqama’s death set the Algerian press to speculating about clashes between the various factions in northern Mali. On Sept. 28 El-Khabar claimed that members of Belmokhtar’s group clashed with Mujao fighters, leaving eight of Belmokhtar’s men dead and Belmokhtar himself “seriously wounded”, supposedly because of disagreements between Belmokhtar and Mujao over how to handle the Algerian diplomats held hostage by the latter. Belmokhtar’s followers denied the news in a call to a Mauritanian news agency on Sept. 30, but the Algerian newspaper insisted its original story is true. However, reports that Belmokhtar has been killed or wounded have been legion over the years, and must always be treated with considerable caution.
    Meanwhile, as Paris, Bamako, ECOWAS and the United Nations continue to debate the possibility of a military intervention against the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance in northern Mali, the chief-of-staff of the Algerian Gendarmerie, Maj-Gen. Ahmed Bousteila, has convened a meeting of Gendarmerie commanders from all the wilayas bordering on Mali and Libya (Adrar, Bechar, Illizi, Ouargla, Tamanrasset and Tindouf). Held in the town of Tamanrasset on Oct. 16, the meeting appears to be mainly concerned with reviewing and optimising border patrols, the Gendarmerie’s border guard units being in the front line in the fight against arms smuggling and other contraband, as well as infiltration/exfiltration of elements linked to AQMI or allied armed groups.
    END
    [1] As it stands, the Hydrocarbons Law is already a strange hybrid: first conceived by then Energy Minister Chakib Khelil as a very liberal piece of legislation, offering international oil companies hitherto unparalleled access to Algeria’s upstream and midstream oil and gas sectors, it was to a large extent vitiated by amendments imposing a minimum 51% stake for Sonatrach in all upstream ventures and slapping a hefty ‘windfall tax’ on IOCs’ production when global oil prices exceed $30/barrel (which of course they have ever since).
    [2] The example of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has influenced Bouteflika in the past, may conceivably have an impact on the President’s personal outlook.
    [3] The approximate size of the multilateral force that has been proposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to re
    conquer northern Mali.
    [4] In his Sept. 25 speech presenting his government’s programme to parliament, Sellal proclaimed that “a strong internal front will protect Algeria against malevolent hands that seek to attack the country’s stability and unity of the Algerian people.”
    [5] See WSSR 120418.
    [6] There was also an incident on Sept. 5, when police manning a checkpoint at the entry to the Béjaïa port opened fire at car that tried to force its way into the port. But it is not clear whether this was the work of jihadists or in anyway connected to terrorism.
    [7] Sic. Apparently referring to the SA-7, Russian-made MANPADS, equivalent to the American Stinger.

  • October Algeria report (Part III)

    Foreign Relations

    Algiers, as we observed in our last report, is faced with a quandary in the festering crisis in northern Mali, where a trio of jihadist groups (AQMI, the closely related MUJAO, and the Malian Tuareg Ansar Dine) have taken power in the wake of February’s revolt led by the ostensibly secular Tuareg-separatist MNLA. While it is clearly uneasy about the emergence of a jihadist quasi-state on its southern border, Algiers is leery of sending its own armed forces to attempt to quash it and is at the same time very reluctant to see other forces – especially extra-regional and a fortiori French forces – take on the job.
    Algiers objects to military intervention on several levels. Operationally, the Algerian military foresees only disaster. As a high-ranking Algerian army officer quoted by French daily Le Figaro (Oct. 1) puts it:
    3,000 men[3], thrown into a theatre of more than 8,000 square kilometres, would be insignificant. What’s more, the invisible, elusive enemy will conduct a war of attrition that it will win for sure, pitted against a military force such as the one ECOWAS is suggesting – a force that is not acquainted with the terrain of the Sahara, either. Finally, armed groups will be able to draw on the support of the local population, the Tuaregs, for whom an African army amounts to a foreign occupation force.
    Politically, Algiers fears the destabilising effect of a military intervention, especially (but not only) if it were to commit troops of its own. Rachid Tlemcani, professor of international politics and regional security at the University of Algiers, sets it out in stark terms:
    Stability is a fundamental issue for Algeria’s leaders. Between now and 2014 (when the next presidential election is due) they want unity and social peace at any price… [Algeria fears] that military intervention could awaken regional, religious or ethnic extremism, and risks opening a Pandora’s box. An explosion in the south would destabilise the north all the way to Morocco. That would be unavoidable. The principle of the inviolability of borders would be challenged, with the risk of implosion as happened in Somalia.
    And on the geopolitical level, the involvement of forces from outside the region in any such adventure gives Algiers nightmares. As we have observed on several occasions over the past year and a half, the NATO intervention in Libya, inspired largely by the French, shocked and dismayed the Algerian regime, which saw the whole episode at best as a dangerous precedent in terms of overriding national sovereignty in the name of the ‘right to protect’ and at worst as proof of the neo-colonial ambitions in North Africa of France and its allies. Since then, there has been a tendency on the part of leading Algerian politicians – including notably President Bouteflika himself and, more recently, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal[4] – to pepper their speeches with references to sinister “foreign hands” seeking to stir up strife in Algeria and generally to prepare the way for outside intervention in the country’s destiny. A person close to the Presidency quoted by Le Figaro explains that what is feared is:
    the return of the old spectre of territorial amputation, as proposed by de Gaulle in 1961[5]. Since the partition of Sudan, our new position as the largest country in Africa ​​makes us extremely fragile – all the more so since, on our southern border, the Tuaregs broke with Bamako and declared their independence.
    Such fears have been expressed with great clarity in an article in Algerian French-language daily El Watan (Oct. 10):
    The fact is that Paris does not care much about the chronic instability in Tunisia, where the Salafists are now able to strut around as if they owned the place. And even less [about the situation] in Libya, where the political crisis is in full swing and where insecurity is rife. For France can barely conceal its geopolitical intentions in the Sahel. Its uranium in Niger has ended up radiating throughout the crisis in Mali, which is as complicated as that of Syria. Spoiling for a fight, under the banner of the UN, France has gone as far as to risk alienating neighboring countries, such as Algeria and Mauritania, which will inevitably suffer the blowback from any military intervention. That is why Algiers and Nouakchott are busy too, drumming up support for efforts to avoid a “French solution”. Faced with the prospect of a quagmire in Mali, there are two distinct camps: the war front led by France and the rejectionist front led by Algeria.
    And indeed, in September and much of the first half of October, there were very clearly two camps in competition: on the one hand the French, lobbying for support for a UN Security Council resolution authorising the ECOWAS to use force against the jihadist entity in northern Mali; and on the other hand the Algerians, lobbying equally actively for a political solution through dialogue and negotiation. To this end, Algeria’s Minister-Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel undertook a tour of Sahel capitals in early October, accompanied amongst others by Maj-Gen. Rachid ‘Attafi’ Lallali, head of the Direction du Renseignement Extérieur (foreign intelligence department) at the DRS. This served to confirm and consolidate the support of the governments of Mauritania and Niger for Algiers’ approach; the government of Mali, which had earlier formally requested a UN resolution authorising the use of force, remained clearly aligned with France. Meanwhile, representatives of Ansar Dine were quietly invited to Algiers for exploratory talks, in the hope of finding at least one negotiating partner. This in turn developed into a further point of disagreement between Algiers and Paris: with the French rejecting negotiations with terrorists outright and considering Ansar Dine to be of a piece with AQMI and MUJAO in this respect, Algeria began to argue that a distinction could be made between Ansar Dine, as an indigenous Malian Tuareg organisation, and the other two groups, made up of committed jihadists from all over north-west Africa.
    By the time French Interior Minister Manuel Valls arrived in Algiers for a two-day visit on Oct. 13, however, Algerian government officials had become much more placatory. This was perhaps in part because Washington, after some humming and hawing, had thrown its weight behind the French-sponsored UNSC Resolution 2071 on northern Mali (approved unanimously by the Security Council on Oct. 12). But it appears also to have been in part the result of the lobbying process of the proceeding weeks. In its attempts to win over the Malian government, Algiers had been compelled to adopt a strong and unambig
    uous stance in favour of Mali’s territorial integrity, which it now considers “non-negotiable” (by contrast, it will be recalled, there were widespread suspicions at the beginning of the year that the Algerian authorities were backing the Tuareg rebellion). Under pressure, the MNLA announced that it was no longer insisting unconditionally on independence for the Azawad (northern Mali), leading in turn to splits in the organisation; in parallel, Algiers appears to be trying to provoke a split in Ansar Dine, between out-and-out jihadists and members of the Ifoghas clan who have joined its ranks largely out of tribal loyalty to Ibrahim Ag Ghaly but have no interest in transnational terrorism. At the same time, Resolution 2071 invites the Malian government, those rebel groups that have “cut off all ties to terrorist organisations” and representatives of the local population to “engage, as soon as possible, in a credible negotiation process in order to seek a sustainable political solution, mindful of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali”, and leaves 45 days for this before the Security Council shall “respond to the request of the Transitional authorities of Mali regarding an international military force assisting the Malian Armed Forces in recovering the occupied regions in the north of Mali”.
    This formulation leaves room for Paris and Algiers to express consensus that, while there can be no negotiations with terrorists, drug-traffickers and secessionists, talks are an essential first step. But Resolution 2071 also seems to leave plenty of room for the divergences between France and Algeria to re-emerge later down the line. As things stand now, it seems unlikely that Ansar Dine will really break with AQMI and MUJAO, while the divided MNLA’s real strength on the ground is a matter of conjecture, leaving very little prospect for meaningful negotiations towards a “sustainable political solution”. Consequently, there seems to be every likelihood that, when the allotted 45 days run out, the UNSC will be called upon to make good on its implied promise to authorise the use of force. And while Resolution 2071 does make a show of putting the Malian army and ECOWAS forces at the centre of a hypothetical military intervention, there can be little doubt that any operation in northern Mali would require French support (in logistics, transport, probably air power and electronic intelligence) and could also entail direct participation of French special forces (notably in attempting to retrieve French hostages held by AQMI/MUJAO). All of which suggests that by late November – with President Hollande’s tentatively planned visit to Algiers just days off – tensions between France and Algeria could be on the rise again.

  • October Algeria report (Part II)

     

    Political Trends

    Appointed just over a month ago, the Sellal government was convened on September 17 for the first full council of ministers meeting chaired by President Bouteflika in seven months. The new government now has a programme of sorts, coupled with a draft budget for 2013 that will soon be put to the vote in parliament. Although its programme includes no lofty ambitions for political transformation, the Sellal government will nonetheless have its hands full fending off socio-economic challenges in the coming period – all the more so given that the crucial presidential election is now just a year and a half away.
    The official communiqué issued after the council of ministers meeting, which outlines the government’s priorities, makes no mention of the promised reform of the constitution, or more generally of the programme of political and institutional reforms launched in April 2011. These, it would seem, are the exclusive prerogative of the Presidency. Prime Minister Sellal and his team, according to the text of the communiqué, are to concentrate on “four main areas”:
    continued improvement of governance such as to strengthen the rule of law, carry through a root and branch rehabilitation of public services and promote national cohesion;
    the consolidation of the economic and financial sphere with a view in particular to strengthening the visibility of the national development process, improving the investment environment, notably as far as land is concerned, continuing the modernization of the financial system and increasing the efficiency of government intervention in the economy;
    the development of socio-economic infrastructures, and in particular implementing scheduled house-building programmes for which all necessary resources will be mobilised, and the expansion of infrastructure networks;
    the promotion of human development through the continued implementation of the reform of the education and training sector, the fight against unemployment, developing government assistance for the less well-off, better support for young people and establishing an efficient cultural policy.
    In our last report, we suggested that the replacement of Ouyahia with Sellal might augur a shift in economic strategy, away from the “economic nationalism” championed by Ouyahia and towards more investor-friendly policies. The reference to “improving the investment environment” in the government communiqué comes as partial confirmation of that, but it would seem that Sellal has been told to tread carefully on this front: presenting his plan of action to parliament on September 25, the new Prime Minister insisted that Algeria “would never become a neoliberal country, but will establish the necessary conditions to encourage direct and indirect investment”; furthermore, the rule requiring a minimum Algerian stake of 51% in all ventures established by foreign firms in Algeria, imposed by his predecessor, is to remain unchanged. This cautious, middle-of-the-road approach is very much in evidence in the government’s new bill to amend the Hydrocarbons Law[1]: on the one hand, the conditions pertaining to IOCs’ exploration and production activities are to be eased, the methodology for determining the tax rate on oil revenues is to be based on a project’s profitability instead of sales, and there are new tax incentives to encourage activities related to unconventional hydrocarbons, small deposits, deposits in under-explored areas, and fields with complex geology and/or lacking infrastructure; while on the other, Sonatrach’s monopoly over pipeline transportation of oil and petroleum products is restored and partnership with Sonatrach in the downstream sector becomes obligatory.
    The 2013 draft budget is also a cautious piece of legislation. Current expenditure having been pumped up by the public sector pay rises that were rolled out last year in a panic reaction to the wave of revolt sweeping through the Arab world, capital expenditure has had to be reined in for the first time in years; taxes, meanwhile, go up. Even so, it is by no means guaranteed that the government will be able to balance the books at the end of the year. For 2013, as for the past several years, revenue has been calculated on the basis of a reference price for crude oil of $37/barrel, and as in previous years, on paper this results in a deficit budget. $37 is of course way below actual international oil prices, and the government has for years now been able not only to wipe out the programmed deficit each year but to run a substantial surplus. By the middle of this year, however, the central bank calculated that an oil price of at least $112/barrel was needed in order to balance the 2012 budget. The 2013 budget requires broadly similar oil price levels in order to break even, and any lasting decline in oil prices in the coming year could therefore have a dramatic effect on Algeria’s fiscal balance, perhaps forcing the government to draw for the first time on the Revenue Regulation Fund established in 2000. Sustained low oil prices might compel the government to review its spending commitments under its five-year infrastructure development plan – putting the regime’s strategy of buying social peace at risk. On top of this, as a major importer of agricultural products Algeria is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global food prices. Drought in the US cereals belt is currently fuelling an explosion in the price of wheat (the main staple in Algeria, in the form of bread and couscous), corn (an essential ingredient of feed for chickens, the main source of meat for ordinary Algerians) and soya (also an input for animal feed, as well as a source of cooking oil). The government’s commitment, also made under the pressure of the Arab Spring, to controling prices for basic foodstuffs means that its subsidies bill will be rising dramatically. Over the medium term, the Algerian government may therefore have to choose between making further cuts to capital expenditure to compensate for runaway spending on consumer subsidies, or cutting subsidies on food and running the risk of bread riots.
    It is against this background that the authorities have begun to crack down on potential agitators, in particular human rights activists and independent trade union organisers, who have been increasingly subject to harassment, arrest and prosecution of late. With the clock now ticking on the countdown to the 2014 presidential election, the regime will be all the more inclined to try and keep a lid on social protests.
    It cannot be entirely ruled out that President Bouteflika – who has been written off as dead or dying more often than can be remembered but who bounced back once again in apparently combative form at the
    September 17 council of ministers meeting – might yet stand for a fourth term of office[2], notwithstanding his earlier hints that the time has come for his generation to stand aside. But a new element has emerged recently in the preparations for 2014 with the creation of Amar Ghoul’s Algerian Hope Rally, more commonly known by its Arabic acronym, TAJ (meaning ‘crown’). Ghoul, who has been Public Works Minister for ten years, broke with the moderate islamist MSP this year in order to hold onto his ministerial position and proceeded to establish TAJ, which was joined by around 40 members of parliament, freshly elected on the MSP ticket or under the colours of Moussa Touati’s Algerian National Front (FNA). In late September, when TAJ held its founding congress, it became clear that the new party enjoys surprisingly abundant financial resources and the tacit complicity, if not outright support, of the authorities. Ghoul has proclaimed that his party, inspired by the example of the FLN during the liberation war, intends to “mobilize the living forces of the country, irrespective of ideological divisions: islamists, nationalists and democrats come together under its banner to inspire hope and build a united, promising and pioneering Algeria” – a discourse which might have come straight from the regime’s copybook. The episode is reminiscent of the creation back in 1997 of the RND, which three months after it was established went on to win the parliamentary elections. This suspiciously premature success, together with the physiognomy of its General Secretary Ahmed Ouyahia, led Algiers wits to dub the RND “the baby that was born with a moustache”. The latest joke, alluding to Amar Ghoul’s islamist background, casts TAJ as “the baby born with a beard”.
    There is now speculation that Ghoul himself is being groomed as a possible successor for Bouteflika in 2014, or at least as a vice president if and when the Presidency finally gets around to amending the constitution. It is worth noting in this respect that Ghoul, although not particularly charismatic, offers the distinct advantage, from the point of view of the regime’s power brokers and in particular DRS chief Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène, of being eminently controllable: deeply involved in corruption in his time as Minister of Public Works, notably in connection with the East-West motorway project, Ghoul has to date never been charged, and rarely even accused publicly, giving those in the know – in other words, the DRS – a potentially powerful hold over him.

  • October Algeria monthly report (Part I)

    ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT #118

    October 17, 2012
    Executive Summary
    Political Trends
    · The new government headed by Abdelmalek Sellal will have its hands full fending off socio-economic challenges in the year and a half left before the presidential election.
    · Current expenditure having been pumped up by last year’s public sector pay rises, capital expenditure has been reined in for the first time in years in the 2013 budget. Even so, the government may be unable to balance the budget if oil prices weaken even moderately.
    – An explosion in international grain prices is set to test the regime’s strategy of ‘buying’ social peace to the limits.
    · There are signs of a crackdown on potential ‘troublemakers’, in particular human rights activists and independent trade union organisers.
    · Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul has established a new party, TAJ, with what seems to be the tacit complicity of the authorities.
    · There is speculation that Ghoul is being groomed as a possible successor for Bouteflika in 2014, or at least as a vice president if and when the constitution is amended.
    Foreign Relations
    · Algiers has spent much of September and early October battling a French-backed diplomatic push in favour of military intervention in northern Mali.
    – Although it has every reason to distrust the jihadist quasi-state that has emerged in northern Mali, Algiers fears the political and geopolitical consequences of military intervention and distrusts Paris’ motives.
    · The gap between the French and the Algerians has lessened somewhat since UNSC Res. 2017, which calls for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement in northern Mali before the use of force can be authorised as a last resort, was passed with American backing,.
    · But with little chance of negotiations succeeding, tensions between Paris and Algiers are likely to re-emerge before François Hollande’s visit to Algiers, tentatively scheduled for early December.
    Security
    · With levels of violence lower than average nationwide and particularly low in Kabylia, the question of whether the jihadist organisation’s capability in its historic heartland has been lastingly degraded remains open.
    · On the other hand, there has been an upsurge in incidents on Algeria’s southern borders, including one operation in which a number of SA-7 man-portable air defence systems, smuggled out of Libya, were reportedly seized by the security forces.
    · As international discussions continue as to the possibility of a military intervention against the jihadist entity in northern Mali, Gendarmerie commanders from all the wilayas bordering on Mali and Libya have been summoned by their national command to a meeting in Tamanrasset to review border security.