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Category: Western Sahara

  • October Algeria report (Part IV)

    Security

    Levels of jihadist activity and related security incidents were somewhat below average in September: only 13 jihadist operations were recorded (down from 15 the previous month and 19 the month before that), out of a total incident count of 23. AQMI’s traditional heartland Kabylia has been particularly quiet: only one terrorism-related incident was reported in the Kabyle wilayas for the whole month between Aug. 13 and Sept. 13[6], and although AQMI activity resumed in Kabylia after that date it remained at a surprisingly low level, with only 8 operations reported for September and the first week of October. Algerian newspapers reported that security forces in the town of Tizi Ouzou, the largest city in Kabylia, were put on “maximum alert” on October 5 after intelligence services received “credible information” of a suicide car bomb “ready to go” in the town, but there does not appear to have been any follow-through. The question of whether AQMI’s capability in its historic heartland has been lastingly degraded, raised in our last report, remains open.
    In ALGIERS, meanwhile, the situation was entirely quiet apart from one incident on Sept. 13 when the authorities destroyed a “suspect package” in the Baïnem forest on the western edges of the capital. A local resident spotted the object and alerted the authorities who cordoned off the area and brought in the bomb squad. The object was destroyed in a controlled explosion and its fragments taken to the lab for inspection. It is not clear, though, whether it was a actually bomb. 
    While the oil- and gas-producing regions of the SOUTH were on the whole quiet, activity and clashes with smugglers on the borders resumed after a four-month hiatus (see previous report). Only two armed clashes on the southern borders were reported from May 23 to September 12, and seven since, including two firefights with smugglers/jihadists around the town of Bordj Baji Mokhtar on the border with Mali, one incident with “jihadists coming in from Libya” near the town of Deb Deb in Illizi, a clash with smugglers south of Djanet on the border with Libya, and a clash “near the border with Niger”. On Oct. 6 special forces units “on the border with Mali” captured “four Mujao jihadists” — three originally from Niger and one Algerian — “using advanced sensing devices brought in from Russia”. The jihadists were trying to sneak their way in among a group of refugees fleeing instability in northern Mali, but they were discovered. They were found to be carrying individual weapons and “an explosive belt”. The next day (Oct. 7) an army force clashed with a group of jihadists of the Belmokhtar group that were trying to cross into Algerian near Tinzaouatin on the Malian border. The army “destroyed an offroader and killed four jihadist”. Further, L’Expression reported on October 9 that the recent dismantling of a “terror support” network in the east of the country has allowed the authorities to seize “SAM-7 missiles[7] smuggled in from Libya”. The newspaper gave no further details, but this “revelation” came a couple of weeks after the commander of a powerful Libyan militia told the Washington Post (Sept. 24) that looters had stolen “a large number” of shoulder-fired, heat-seeking missiles (manpads) from the militia’s base in Benghazi when protesters who called for dismantling the country’s militias overran the compound. It is worth recalling here that the Algerian press has frequently talked of manpads seized by the authorities on the borders or smuggled into the country, but on the ground there is no firm evidence that Aqmi in Algeria itself has such weapons.
    Across the border in northern Mali, Aqmi’s “emir of the Sahara region”, Nabil Makhloufi (aka, Abou Alqama, an Algerian national) was killed “in a car accident” north of Gao on September 8, according to reports on Mauritanian news sites, later confirmed by Aqmi itself. On October 4 ANI, a Mauritanian news agency, said Jemal Oukacha, alias Yahya Abou El Hammam, a close aid to Aqmi Emir Abdelmalik Droukdel, was named the group’s emir for the Sahara region. Abou El Hammam, an Algerian national, is one of the most prominent Al-Qaeda leaders in northern Mali, and was earlier this year appointed “governor of Timbuktu” by the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance which currently controls northern Mali.
    The news of Abou Alqama’s death set the Algerian press to speculating about clashes between the various factions in northern Mali. On Sept. 28 El-Khabar claimed that members of Belmokhtar’s group clashed with Mujao fighters, leaving eight of Belmokhtar’s men dead and Belmokhtar himself “seriously wounded”, supposedly because of disagreements between Belmokhtar and Mujao over how to handle the Algerian diplomats held hostage by the latter. Belmokhtar’s followers denied the news in a call to a Mauritanian news agency on Sept. 30, but the Algerian newspaper insisted its original story is true. However, reports that Belmokhtar has been killed or wounded have been legion over the years, and must always be treated with considerable caution.
    Meanwhile, as Paris, Bamako, ECOWAS and the United Nations continue to debate the possibility of a military intervention against the AQMI/MUJAO/Ansar Dine alliance in northern Mali, the chief-of-staff of the Algerian Gendarmerie, Maj-Gen. Ahmed Bousteila, has convened a meeting of Gendarmerie commanders from all the wilayas bordering on Mali and Libya (Adrar, Bechar, Illizi, Ouargla, Tamanrasset and Tindouf). Held in the town of Tamanrasset on Oct. 16, the meeting appears to be mainly concerned with reviewing and optimising border patrols, the Gendarmerie’s border guard units being in the front line in the fight against arms smuggling and other contraband, as well as infiltration/exfiltration of elements linked to AQMI or allied armed groups.
    END
    [1] As it stands, the Hydrocarbons Law is already a strange hybrid: first conceived by then Energy Minister Chakib Khelil as a very liberal piece of legislation, offering international oil companies hitherto unparalleled access to Algeria’s upstream and midstream oil and gas sectors, it was to a large extent vitiated by amendments imposing a minimum 51% stake for Sonatrach in all upstream ventures and slapping a hefty ‘windfall tax’ on IOCs’ production when global oil prices exceed $30/barrel (which of course they have ever since).
    [2] The example of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has influenced Bouteflika in the past, may conceivably have an impact on the President’s personal outlook.
    [3] The approximate size of the multilateral force that has been proposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to re
    conquer northern Mali.
    [4] In his Sept. 25 speech presenting his government’s programme to parliament, Sellal proclaimed that “a strong internal front will protect Algeria against malevolent hands that seek to attack the country’s stability and unity of the Algerian people.”
    [5] See WSSR 120418.
    [6] There was also an incident on Sept. 5, when police manning a checkpoint at the entry to the Béjaïa port opened fire at car that tried to force its way into the port. But it is not clear whether this was the work of jihadists or in anyway connected to terrorism.
    [7] Sic. Apparently referring to the SA-7, Russian-made MANPADS, equivalent to the American Stinger.

  • October Algeria report (Part III)

    Foreign Relations

    Algiers, as we observed in our last report, is faced with a quandary in the festering crisis in northern Mali, where a trio of jihadist groups (AQMI, the closely related MUJAO, and the Malian Tuareg Ansar Dine) have taken power in the wake of February’s revolt led by the ostensibly secular Tuareg-separatist MNLA. While it is clearly uneasy about the emergence of a jihadist quasi-state on its southern border, Algiers is leery of sending its own armed forces to attempt to quash it and is at the same time very reluctant to see other forces – especially extra-regional and a fortiori French forces – take on the job.
    Algiers objects to military intervention on several levels. Operationally, the Algerian military foresees only disaster. As a high-ranking Algerian army officer quoted by French daily Le Figaro (Oct. 1) puts it:
    3,000 men[3], thrown into a theatre of more than 8,000 square kilometres, would be insignificant. What’s more, the invisible, elusive enemy will conduct a war of attrition that it will win for sure, pitted against a military force such as the one ECOWAS is suggesting – a force that is not acquainted with the terrain of the Sahara, either. Finally, armed groups will be able to draw on the support of the local population, the Tuaregs, for whom an African army amounts to a foreign occupation force.
    Politically, Algiers fears the destabilising effect of a military intervention, especially (but not only) if it were to commit troops of its own. Rachid Tlemcani, professor of international politics and regional security at the University of Algiers, sets it out in stark terms:
    Stability is a fundamental issue for Algeria’s leaders. Between now and 2014 (when the next presidential election is due) they want unity and social peace at any price… [Algeria fears] that military intervention could awaken regional, religious or ethnic extremism, and risks opening a Pandora’s box. An explosion in the south would destabilise the north all the way to Morocco. That would be unavoidable. The principle of the inviolability of borders would be challenged, with the risk of implosion as happened in Somalia.
    And on the geopolitical level, the involvement of forces from outside the region in any such adventure gives Algiers nightmares. As we have observed on several occasions over the past year and a half, the NATO intervention in Libya, inspired largely by the French, shocked and dismayed the Algerian regime, which saw the whole episode at best as a dangerous precedent in terms of overriding national sovereignty in the name of the ‘right to protect’ and at worst as proof of the neo-colonial ambitions in North Africa of France and its allies. Since then, there has been a tendency on the part of leading Algerian politicians – including notably President Bouteflika himself and, more recently, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal[4] – to pepper their speeches with references to sinister “foreign hands” seeking to stir up strife in Algeria and generally to prepare the way for outside intervention in the country’s destiny. A person close to the Presidency quoted by Le Figaro explains that what is feared is:
    the return of the old spectre of territorial amputation, as proposed by de Gaulle in 1961[5]. Since the partition of Sudan, our new position as the largest country in Africa ​​makes us extremely fragile – all the more so since, on our southern border, the Tuaregs broke with Bamako and declared their independence.
    Such fears have been expressed with great clarity in an article in Algerian French-language daily El Watan (Oct. 10):
    The fact is that Paris does not care much about the chronic instability in Tunisia, where the Salafists are now able to strut around as if they owned the place. And even less [about the situation] in Libya, where the political crisis is in full swing and where insecurity is rife. For France can barely conceal its geopolitical intentions in the Sahel. Its uranium in Niger has ended up radiating throughout the crisis in Mali, which is as complicated as that of Syria. Spoiling for a fight, under the banner of the UN, France has gone as far as to risk alienating neighboring countries, such as Algeria and Mauritania, which will inevitably suffer the blowback from any military intervention. That is why Algiers and Nouakchott are busy too, drumming up support for efforts to avoid a “French solution”. Faced with the prospect of a quagmire in Mali, there are two distinct camps: the war front led by France and the rejectionist front led by Algeria.
    And indeed, in September and much of the first half of October, there were very clearly two camps in competition: on the one hand the French, lobbying for support for a UN Security Council resolution authorising the ECOWAS to use force against the jihadist entity in northern Mali; and on the other hand the Algerians, lobbying equally actively for a political solution through dialogue and negotiation. To this end, Algeria’s Minister-Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel undertook a tour of Sahel capitals in early October, accompanied amongst others by Maj-Gen. Rachid ‘Attafi’ Lallali, head of the Direction du Renseignement Extérieur (foreign intelligence department) at the DRS. This served to confirm and consolidate the support of the governments of Mauritania and Niger for Algiers’ approach; the government of Mali, which had earlier formally requested a UN resolution authorising the use of force, remained clearly aligned with France. Meanwhile, representatives of Ansar Dine were quietly invited to Algiers for exploratory talks, in the hope of finding at least one negotiating partner. This in turn developed into a further point of disagreement between Algiers and Paris: with the French rejecting negotiations with terrorists outright and considering Ansar Dine to be of a piece with AQMI and MUJAO in this respect, Algeria began to argue that a distinction could be made between Ansar Dine, as an indigenous Malian Tuareg organisation, and the other two groups, made up of committed jihadists from all over north-west Africa.
    By the time French Interior Minister Manuel Valls arrived in Algiers for a two-day visit on Oct. 13, however, Algerian government officials had become much more placatory. This was perhaps in part because Washington, after some humming and hawing, had thrown its weight behind the French-sponsored UNSC Resolution 2071 on northern Mali (approved unanimously by the Security Council on Oct. 12). But it appears also to have been in part the result of the lobbying process of the proceeding weeks. In its attempts to win over the Malian government, Algiers had been compelled to adopt a strong and unambig
    uous stance in favour of Mali’s territorial integrity, which it now considers “non-negotiable” (by contrast, it will be recalled, there were widespread suspicions at the beginning of the year that the Algerian authorities were backing the Tuareg rebellion). Under pressure, the MNLA announced that it was no longer insisting unconditionally on independence for the Azawad (northern Mali), leading in turn to splits in the organisation; in parallel, Algiers appears to be trying to provoke a split in Ansar Dine, between out-and-out jihadists and members of the Ifoghas clan who have joined its ranks largely out of tribal loyalty to Ibrahim Ag Ghaly but have no interest in transnational terrorism. At the same time, Resolution 2071 invites the Malian government, those rebel groups that have “cut off all ties to terrorist organisations” and representatives of the local population to “engage, as soon as possible, in a credible negotiation process in order to seek a sustainable political solution, mindful of the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali”, and leaves 45 days for this before the Security Council shall “respond to the request of the Transitional authorities of Mali regarding an international military force assisting the Malian Armed Forces in recovering the occupied regions in the north of Mali”.
    This formulation leaves room for Paris and Algiers to express consensus that, while there can be no negotiations with terrorists, drug-traffickers and secessionists, talks are an essential first step. But Resolution 2071 also seems to leave plenty of room for the divergences between France and Algeria to re-emerge later down the line. As things stand now, it seems unlikely that Ansar Dine will really break with AQMI and MUJAO, while the divided MNLA’s real strength on the ground is a matter of conjecture, leaving very little prospect for meaningful negotiations towards a “sustainable political solution”. Consequently, there seems to be every likelihood that, when the allotted 45 days run out, the UNSC will be called upon to make good on its implied promise to authorise the use of force. And while Resolution 2071 does make a show of putting the Malian army and ECOWAS forces at the centre of a hypothetical military intervention, there can be little doubt that any operation in northern Mali would require French support (in logistics, transport, probably air power and electronic intelligence) and could also entail direct participation of French special forces (notably in attempting to retrieve French hostages held by AQMI/MUJAO). All of which suggests that by late November – with President Hollande’s tentatively planned visit to Algiers just days off – tensions between France and Algeria could be on the rise again.

  • October Algeria report (Part II)

     

    Political Trends

    Appointed just over a month ago, the Sellal government was convened on September 17 for the first full council of ministers meeting chaired by President Bouteflika in seven months. The new government now has a programme of sorts, coupled with a draft budget for 2013 that will soon be put to the vote in parliament. Although its programme includes no lofty ambitions for political transformation, the Sellal government will nonetheless have its hands full fending off socio-economic challenges in the coming period – all the more so given that the crucial presidential election is now just a year and a half away.
    The official communiqué issued after the council of ministers meeting, which outlines the government’s priorities, makes no mention of the promised reform of the constitution, or more generally of the programme of political and institutional reforms launched in April 2011. These, it would seem, are the exclusive prerogative of the Presidency. Prime Minister Sellal and his team, according to the text of the communiqué, are to concentrate on “four main areas”:
    continued improvement of governance such as to strengthen the rule of law, carry through a root and branch rehabilitation of public services and promote national cohesion;
    the consolidation of the economic and financial sphere with a view in particular to strengthening the visibility of the national development process, improving the investment environment, notably as far as land is concerned, continuing the modernization of the financial system and increasing the efficiency of government intervention in the economy;
    the development of socio-economic infrastructures, and in particular implementing scheduled house-building programmes for which all necessary resources will be mobilised, and the expansion of infrastructure networks;
    the promotion of human development through the continued implementation of the reform of the education and training sector, the fight against unemployment, developing government assistance for the less well-off, better support for young people and establishing an efficient cultural policy.
    In our last report, we suggested that the replacement of Ouyahia with Sellal might augur a shift in economic strategy, away from the “economic nationalism” championed by Ouyahia and towards more investor-friendly policies. The reference to “improving the investment environment” in the government communiqué comes as partial confirmation of that, but it would seem that Sellal has been told to tread carefully on this front: presenting his plan of action to parliament on September 25, the new Prime Minister insisted that Algeria “would never become a neoliberal country, but will establish the necessary conditions to encourage direct and indirect investment”; furthermore, the rule requiring a minimum Algerian stake of 51% in all ventures established by foreign firms in Algeria, imposed by his predecessor, is to remain unchanged. This cautious, middle-of-the-road approach is very much in evidence in the government’s new bill to amend the Hydrocarbons Law[1]: on the one hand, the conditions pertaining to IOCs’ exploration and production activities are to be eased, the methodology for determining the tax rate on oil revenues is to be based on a project’s profitability instead of sales, and there are new tax incentives to encourage activities related to unconventional hydrocarbons, small deposits, deposits in under-explored areas, and fields with complex geology and/or lacking infrastructure; while on the other, Sonatrach’s monopoly over pipeline transportation of oil and petroleum products is restored and partnership with Sonatrach in the downstream sector becomes obligatory.
    The 2013 draft budget is also a cautious piece of legislation. Current expenditure having been pumped up by the public sector pay rises that were rolled out last year in a panic reaction to the wave of revolt sweeping through the Arab world, capital expenditure has had to be reined in for the first time in years; taxes, meanwhile, go up. Even so, it is by no means guaranteed that the government will be able to balance the books at the end of the year. For 2013, as for the past several years, revenue has been calculated on the basis of a reference price for crude oil of $37/barrel, and as in previous years, on paper this results in a deficit budget. $37 is of course way below actual international oil prices, and the government has for years now been able not only to wipe out the programmed deficit each year but to run a substantial surplus. By the middle of this year, however, the central bank calculated that an oil price of at least $112/barrel was needed in order to balance the 2012 budget. The 2013 budget requires broadly similar oil price levels in order to break even, and any lasting decline in oil prices in the coming year could therefore have a dramatic effect on Algeria’s fiscal balance, perhaps forcing the government to draw for the first time on the Revenue Regulation Fund established in 2000. Sustained low oil prices might compel the government to review its spending commitments under its five-year infrastructure development plan – putting the regime’s strategy of buying social peace at risk. On top of this, as a major importer of agricultural products Algeria is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global food prices. Drought in the US cereals belt is currently fuelling an explosion in the price of wheat (the main staple in Algeria, in the form of bread and couscous), corn (an essential ingredient of feed for chickens, the main source of meat for ordinary Algerians) and soya (also an input for animal feed, as well as a source of cooking oil). The government’s commitment, also made under the pressure of the Arab Spring, to controling prices for basic foodstuffs means that its subsidies bill will be rising dramatically. Over the medium term, the Algerian government may therefore have to choose between making further cuts to capital expenditure to compensate for runaway spending on consumer subsidies, or cutting subsidies on food and running the risk of bread riots.
    It is against this background that the authorities have begun to crack down on potential agitators, in particular human rights activists and independent trade union organisers, who have been increasingly subject to harassment, arrest and prosecution of late. With the clock now ticking on the countdown to the 2014 presidential election, the regime will be all the more inclined to try and keep a lid on social protests.
    It cannot be entirely ruled out that President Bouteflika – who has been written off as dead or dying more often than can be remembered but who bounced back once again in apparently combative form at the
    September 17 council of ministers meeting – might yet stand for a fourth term of office[2], notwithstanding his earlier hints that the time has come for his generation to stand aside. But a new element has emerged recently in the preparations for 2014 with the creation of Amar Ghoul’s Algerian Hope Rally, more commonly known by its Arabic acronym, TAJ (meaning ‘crown’). Ghoul, who has been Public Works Minister for ten years, broke with the moderate islamist MSP this year in order to hold onto his ministerial position and proceeded to establish TAJ, which was joined by around 40 members of parliament, freshly elected on the MSP ticket or under the colours of Moussa Touati’s Algerian National Front (FNA). In late September, when TAJ held its founding congress, it became clear that the new party enjoys surprisingly abundant financial resources and the tacit complicity, if not outright support, of the authorities. Ghoul has proclaimed that his party, inspired by the example of the FLN during the liberation war, intends to “mobilize the living forces of the country, irrespective of ideological divisions: islamists, nationalists and democrats come together under its banner to inspire hope and build a united, promising and pioneering Algeria” – a discourse which might have come straight from the regime’s copybook. The episode is reminiscent of the creation back in 1997 of the RND, which three months after it was established went on to win the parliamentary elections. This suspiciously premature success, together with the physiognomy of its General Secretary Ahmed Ouyahia, led Algiers wits to dub the RND “the baby that was born with a moustache”. The latest joke, alluding to Amar Ghoul’s islamist background, casts TAJ as “the baby born with a beard”.
    There is now speculation that Ghoul himself is being groomed as a possible successor for Bouteflika in 2014, or at least as a vice president if and when the Presidency finally gets around to amending the constitution. It is worth noting in this respect that Ghoul, although not particularly charismatic, offers the distinct advantage, from the point of view of the regime’s power brokers and in particular DRS chief Mohamed ‘Tewfik’ Médiène, of being eminently controllable: deeply involved in corruption in his time as Minister of Public Works, notably in connection with the East-West motorway project, Ghoul has to date never been charged, and rarely even accused publicly, giving those in the know – in other words, the DRS – a potentially powerful hold over him.

  • October Algeria monthly report (Part I)

    ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT #118

    October 17, 2012
    Executive Summary
    Political Trends
    · The new government headed by Abdelmalek Sellal will have its hands full fending off socio-economic challenges in the year and a half left before the presidential election.
    · Current expenditure having been pumped up by last year’s public sector pay rises, capital expenditure has been reined in for the first time in years in the 2013 budget. Even so, the government may be unable to balance the budget if oil prices weaken even moderately.
    – An explosion in international grain prices is set to test the regime’s strategy of ‘buying’ social peace to the limits.
    · There are signs of a crackdown on potential ‘troublemakers’, in particular human rights activists and independent trade union organisers.
    · Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul has established a new party, TAJ, with what seems to be the tacit complicity of the authorities.
    · There is speculation that Ghoul is being groomed as a possible successor for Bouteflika in 2014, or at least as a vice president if and when the constitution is amended.
    Foreign Relations
    · Algiers has spent much of September and early October battling a French-backed diplomatic push in favour of military intervention in northern Mali.
    – Although it has every reason to distrust the jihadist quasi-state that has emerged in northern Mali, Algiers fears the political and geopolitical consequences of military intervention and distrusts Paris’ motives.
    · The gap between the French and the Algerians has lessened somewhat since UNSC Res. 2017, which calls for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement in northern Mali before the use of force can be authorised as a last resort, was passed with American backing,.
    · But with little chance of negotiations succeeding, tensions between Paris and Algiers are likely to re-emerge before François Hollande’s visit to Algiers, tentatively scheduled for early December.
    Security
    · With levels of violence lower than average nationwide and particularly low in Kabylia, the question of whether the jihadist organisation’s capability in its historic heartland has been lastingly degraded remains open.
    · On the other hand, there has been an upsurge in incidents on Algeria’s southern borders, including one operation in which a number of SA-7 man-portable air defence systems, smuggled out of Libya, were reportedly seized by the security forces.
    · As international discussions continue as to the possibility of a military intervention against the jihadist entity in northern Mali, Gendarmerie commanders from all the wilayas bordering on Mali and Libya have been summoned by their national command to a meeting in Tamanrasset to review border security.

  • July Algeria montrhly report (Part II)

    Foreign Relations

    Freshly installed in the Elysée Palace, France’s new Socialist President François Hollande, on whom great hopes have been pinned in terms of breaking the deadlock in relations with Algeria, marked the historically charged 50th anniversary of Algeria’s independence with a short but polite letter to President Bouteflika. While it was by no means earth-shattering, Hollande’s missive marked a tentative step in the direction of at least recognising, if not apologising for, the crimes of colonialism:
    I heard your call, on May 8, for an objective reading of history, uninfluenced by wars of remembrance or by passing differences [between France and Algeria]. Frenchmen and Algerians have a shared responsibility: to tell the truth. They owe it to their forebears, but also to their youth. France considers that there is now space for a lucid and responsible examination of its painful colonial past, as well as for a confident momentum forward.
    President Bouteflika reciprocated with a letter to mark France’s national day on July 14 that showed some readiness to engage with Hollande’s overture:
    Relations between Algeria and France pre-date the colonial period, which left a particularly strong mark our common history, and lasting scars on both our peoples. For Algerians, the resulting wounds are deep, but we wish, like you, to look to tomorrow and try to build a future of peace and prosperity for the youth of both our countries. To that end, it is time to exorcise the past by submitting it, together and in the appropriate frameworks, to a brave and lucid examination that will strengthen our bonds of esteem and friendship.
    Whether this will be sufficient to wipe the slate clean and “reset” relations between Paris and Algiers remains to be seen, but the tone is certainly a positive one. In the new Socialist administration’s first days in office, when ministerial teams were still settling in and no clear schedules had yet been established, there was even some speculation that Hollande might visit Algiers this summer, although the tentative date for an official visit has since been pushed back several times. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius is now talking about a presidential visit “at the end of the year”, during which a “new, very high-level partnership” between the two countries might be signed.
    Ostensibly, it was largely to prepare for just such a trip that two high-level French delegations jetted into Algiers in July. On closer examination, however, other, more pressing matters topped the agenda. The first visit took place on the eve of Algerian independence day, when a team headed by François Hollande’s African affairs advisor Hélène Le Gall arrived for talks with top officials. The fact that it was Le Gall – a career diplomat whose main area of interest and expertise is sub-Saharan Africa[1] – who headed the delegation was in itself a pointer to the most urgent issue at stake: the intractable crisis opened up in northern Mali by the Tuareg revolt, the coup in Bamako and the hardline islamist takeover in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Northern Mali seems also to have been one of the most important topics raised by Fabius when he visited on July 15-16.
    Extremely concerned at the prospect of AQMI and its allies Ansar Dine and MUJAO establishing an ‘Afghanistan in the Sahel’, Paris has been urging Algeria to make an active contribution to multilateral efforts to restore the authority of the central government in the north of Mali. This much has been discussed openly in the press, on both sides of the Mediterranean, and indeed François Hollande himself has been quoted as telling a council of ministers meeting on July 13 that any solution to the problem of Mali “must pass through Algiers”. Less publicly, French intelligence sources have hinted that the successive French visitors have been lobbying Algiers to give at least tacit assent to an intervention by French special forces (perhaps under the cover of an agreement with the African Union[2]).
    In its public pronouncements, Algiers has so far held fast to its rejection of outside involvement in the region, as well as to its long-established doctrine of refusing to conduct military operations of its own beyond its borders. Consolidation of a jihadist entity on their southern frontiers may yet force their hand, but the Algerians certainly have powerful reasons to be wary of sending their own troops over the border. There is the danger of becoming bogged down in an unwinnable conflict that would almost certainly have a destabilising effect at home, to begin with. On top of that, in the case of a multilateral operation Algiers fears that its armed forces would effectively be used as auxiliaries by outside powers (France, of course, but perhaps also the United States, which is reported to have been exerting similar pressure), to which it would effectively be surrendering a fragment of its cherished sovereignty. 
    In parallel to these contacts with Algiers, Parisian diplomatic and political circles have begun to notice a subtle shift in the French government’s attitude towards Morocco. More specifically, there is a feeling that under Hollande, Paris is no longer prepared to back Rabat unconditionally and to the hilt on the Western Sahara question. And this is seen as flowing precisely from the drive to mend fences with Algiers.
    Following this logic, Paris salons perceive two imperatives at work. On the one hand, and plausibly enough, the need to secure Algiers’ acquiescence for a military intervention, in one form or another, in northern Mali. On the other hand, and rather less obviously, it is suggested that the incoming Socialist government, anticipating a further worsening of the European monetary and financial crisis that might stretch the French state’s finances to near breaking point, could be seeking to prepare the way for Algeria – whose foreign currency reserves hit $200bn earlier this year and are still growing – to contribute to a bailout in one form or another, if and when necessary.
    The idea of Algeria lending directly to the French Treasury would almost certainly prove too unpalatable to public opinion on either side of the Mediterranean to be politically feasible. But it is by no means out of the question that Paris may be involved in persuading Algeria to lend more money to the International Monetary Fund, as was requested in April, in order to shore up its ability to provide emergency assistance to governments facing financial meltdown.
    Security
    L
    evels of violence in June were below average, with 23 incidents overall including 11 jihadist operations proper (i.e. initiated by AQMI or MUJAO). Jihadist activity picked up somewhat in July, with 12 operations in the first three weeks of the month (against only four operations initiated by the security forces). The first week of July was particularly busy, with six jihadist operations reported. Past experience suggests that the coming few weeks may see intense jihadist activity programmed to coincide with the holy month of Ramadan (began on July 20), which is seen as particularly auspicious for jihad[3]. 
    While Algiers and its environs remained quiet, on June 29 Algeria’s southern provinces saw their second suicide bombing since early March (see AMSR #113 of April 3). This time it was the city of Ouargla, in the centre of Algeria’s largest oil basin, that was hit: a suicide car bomber targeted the town’s Gendarmerie headquarters, killing one gendarme and wounding two others, in addition to the bomber himself. The operation, like the Tamanrasset suicide car bombing in March, was claimed by Mujao the following day. On July 10, El-Khabar said security forces reinforced their presence in the nearby oil town of Hassi Messaoud, looking for “terrorist elements” that might have “taken refuge” there.
    Although the Ouargla bombing was operationally speaking relatively unsuccessful — the car could not break through the concrete barriers at the building’s entry, hence the low death toll — it remains a worrying development for Algerian authorities. MUJAO, a recently established organisation based across the border in northern Mali, has now proved capable of planning and carrying out two suicide attacks in four months in Algeria’s deep south, a region where suicide bombings were hitherto unknown and terrorist activity was limited to mostly smuggling or, at worst, kidnapping of foreign nationals. In both operations, MUJAO targeted security forces, but the possibility that it might attempt to hit oil and gas installations cannot be discounted. Since the Ouargla attack, it has been reported that the security forces in Hassi Rmel, Algeria’s main gas hub, have begun stepping up security at production sites and other facilities.
    Along Algeria’s southern border itself, the situation was remarkably quiet. The only incident reported came on June 25 when the army intercepted a group of jihadists, believed to belong to MUJAO, south of Reggane (wilaya of Adrar). Two jihadists were killed, one wounded and one captured. This makes June the quietest month on Algeria’s southern borders for at least the past two years (for comparison, there were five incidents in this area in May alone). There is no clear explanation for this sudden lull, and a media blackout is not to be ruled out. In the meantime, a group of experts from the Defence and Interior Ministries is reported to have been examining the feasibility of installing advanced electronic border control systems, inspired by systems used along the US-Mexico and Saudi Arabia-Iraq borders, and is said to be due to submit its report to the two ministries and the presidency in the near future.
    Beyond Algeria’s southern border, the most notable development was MUJAO’s liberation of several hostages. Three European hostages — two Spanish aid workers and one Italian — it kidnapped from Tindouf, Algeria, in October 2011 (see AMSR #108 of October 24, 2011) were freed in mid-July. A MUJAO spokesman told afp (quoted in El-Khabar, 19/7) that the organisation released them because “our conditions have been met”, amid reports that the jihadist group had received a hefty ransom and had three detainees in Mauritanian prisons set free. Two days earlier, MUJAO had released three of the seven Algerian diplomats its took hostage in Gao, northern Mali, in early April. The Algerian authorities deny having paid a ransom, but there are strong suspicions that money did change hands in exchange for the diplomats – which would represent a major dent in Algiers’ longstanding policy of opposition of ransom payments to terrorist groups.
    END
    Ambassador Edward M. Gabriel

  • July Algeria monthly situation report (Part I)

    ALGERIA MONTHLY SITUATION REPORT

    July 25, 2012
    Executive Summary
    Political Trends
    · The newly elected parliament has gone into summer recess without having discussed any laws or constitutional issues or taken a single vote on any matter.
    · There is still no new government and President Bouteflika has begun his annual performance-evaluation interviews with the ‘interim’ ministers.
    · With Ahmed Ouyahia reportedly ruled out, the main sticking point in selecting a new government appears to be the choice of prime minister.
    · With the political reform process looking increasingly irrelevant, there has been some speculation that President Bouteflika may not bow out in 2014 after all and opt to run for a fourth successive term of office.
    Foreign Relations
    · Bouteflika and France’s newly elected President Hollande have exchanged letters which tentatively look beyond the sterile dispute over official declarations relating to the colonial period which has been a blockage in Franco-Algerian relations.
    · French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius visited Algiers in mid-July, and is now talking of a possible official visit by Hollande at the end of this year, during which a new “very high-level partnership” might be signed.
    · Paris’ most urgent imperative is to bring Algeria on board with international moves to crush the hardline islamist entity in northern Mali, but Algiers is reluctant to either give its assent to an intervention by French troops or commit troops of its own to a potentially destabilising adventure.
    · The need to secure Algerian cooperation in northern Mali may be one reason behind perceived shifts in the French government’s attitude towards Morocco, notably on the Western Sahara question. Another may be efforts to persuade Algeria to mobilise its considerable hard currency reserves in support of international financial bail-out funds.
    Security
    · Levels of violence dipped in June but rose again in July, as jihadist groups geared up for Ramadan, seen as a particularly propitious period for jihad.
    · AQMI split-off MUJAO has carried out another suicide bombing against a gendarmerie facility in the south of the country.
    · In light of the threat of MUJAO launching attacks against oil and gas installations in the south, the authorities have reportedly stepped up security around facilities in and around the Hassi Rmel gas hub, and are evaluating advanced electronic surveillance systems for the southern borders.
    Political Trends
    On July 2, the parliament that elected in May in what was supposed to be a key step in the process of political and institutional reform, went into summer recess, without having discussed a single law or taken a single vote on any issue. Neither had it had the chance to see in the long-awaited new government – which three weeks later has still not been formed. Indeed, the very idea of naming a new prime minister and cabinet has effectively been pushed back until after the summer break: on July 22 Bouteflika launched the round of performance-evaluation interviews with cabinet members that he holds every year during Ramadan, regardless of the fact that they are technically only caretaker ministers, in a clear sign that he is in no hurry to announce a new line-up.
    There have been suggestions in the Algerian press that the delay in forming a new cabinet is chiefly due to the refusal of the various political parties with representation in the new parliament to join a coalition government. But there have been few signs of any real negotiations or even active attempts to persuade parties hitherto in the opposition to come on board, and it ought to have been possible for the Presidency and the DRS to pull together a cabinet from the FLN and the RND, which together have a clear majority, had the will existed. True, both the FLN and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the RND remain riven with internal crises, as are virtually all of Algeria’s political parties (the moderate islamist MSP, having withdrawn from the ruling coalition, is facing a minor split led by former Public Works Minister Amar Ghoul, precisely over the question of participation in government). But the biggest sticking point is doubtless the choice of Prime Minister, insofar as this risks being widely interpreted – rightly or wrongly – as an indication of the regime’s choice of successor for Bouteflika. Discussing the issue towards the end of June – at which time they claimed a new government would be unveiled “soon” – usually candid sources close to the Presidency were somewhat cagey, although they did seem adamant that Ouyahia would not be reappointed. In this sense, the continued delay in choosing a new Prime Minister underlines the fact that, with Ouyahia out of the running, there is no obvious successor to Bouteflika. Candidates who are now being considered for the position of Prime Minister – the name of Abdelmalek Sellal, currently Minister of Water Resources, has been floated by sources – appear to be compromise figures, probably lacking presidential stature.
    Such is the impasse that there is now rising speculation in the Algerian media that President Bouteflika may not bow out at the end of his current term of office, as has been generally assumed for some time, and could instead seek to embark of a fourth term of office. Given Bouteflika’s declining vigour this may not be the most likely scenario, and it would certainly be at variants with the perceived message of his May 8 speech in Setif (see previous reports), in which he seemed to indicate that the time had come for his generation to hand over the reins of power to the post-independence generations. But the very fact that such a scenario is now being seriously discussed is testimony to just how sclerotic the Algerian political system is. Promises to reform it now seem increasingly irrelevant: although the initial p
    lan unveiled by Bouteflika in April 2011 (and to which he continues, on occasion, to pay lip-service) was to have the newly elected parliament propose constitutional amendments which might then be submitted to approval by referendum, there was no discussion whatsoever of constitutional matters in the two short months the new parliament sat before breaking up for the summer, the constitutional reform committee that was supposed to generate ideas and proposals has not been established, and it is widely assumed that the whole process has been postponed until a later, and unspecified, date.
    In the meantime, Bouteflika has been officiating over the celebrations to mark the first 50 years of Algeria’s independence, and over the military promotions ceremony which coincides every year with independence day. For such a momentous date, Algeria’s 50th anniversary celebrations were on the whole surprisingly low-key. Neither were the military promotions particularly spectacular, but they did in their quiet way mark another step in the generational shift within the armed forces and the all-important DRS – as exemplified by the elevation of Gen. Bachir Tartag, who took over as head of the DRS’s crucial Directorate of Internal Security at the end of last year, to the rank of major-general.

  • Talking points for calls with Congressman Hal Rogers

     

    TO: Ambassador Bouhlal 

     

    FR: Ed Gabriel, MAC team 

     

    RE: Phone Call with Rep. Hal Rogers (R-KY) regarding the House Foreign Operations Bill 

     

    The number for the office of Chairman Rogers is 202-225-4601.  

     

    Most of the time, the Congressman will not be available and will call back later in the day.  

     

    Background 

     

    Rep. Hal Rogers is a Republican from Kentucky. Rep. Rogers is Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and the most powerful person on the Committee. He has a reputation as a skillful insider with significant influence over a wide range of areas.  

     

    He was born in rural Kentucky and has represented the 5th district for 13 terms, making him the longest serving Kentucky republican ever elected to federal office.  

     

    Rep. Rogers has been a consistent supporter of Morocco. He visited Morocco when Ed Gabriel was serving as US Ambassador in Rabat. He has sent a staffer on the Congressional Staff Delegation to Morocco. In 2004 he voted in favor of the Free Trade Agreement. In 2007 and 2009 he signed both House letters supporting the Moroccan Autonomy plan.   

     

    As a strong supporter of Morocco and resolving the dispute over the Western Sahara based on Autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, Rep. Rogers should be supportive of the report language. 

     

    Rep. Rogers has a very busy week as they are marking up 4 of the biggest Appropriations bills (Homeland, Defense, and Military Construction, in addition to our bill) and will likely not want to talk for a long time. Rep. Rogers will want to hear that this language has the support of key Republicans on the subcommittee like Kay Granger and Mario Diaz-Balart. 

     

    Goal 

     

    To Thank Chairman Rogers for his support over the years and thank him for the positive report language that was included by the Subcommittee. 

     

    Talking Points 

     

    • Thank Chairman Rogers for his support over the years. 

     

    • Thank him for the positive language that was included by the Subcommittee under the leadership of Republican Chairwoman Granger and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart on the issue of resolving the Western Sahara based.  MAKE SURE to use the correct member reference above for each call you make.  One of the talking points references the Republican member who helped us, the other references the Democratic member who helped us.   

     

     

    • Morocco very much appreciates this attention from the Congress and we believe your actions will prove very helpful to security and stability in the region. 

     

    • If he asks for more information you can explain how the positive report language notes how the deteriorating security situation makes it imperative to resolve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.  

     

    • Resolving the dispute based on Autonomy/Sovereignty is the long time position of Chairman Rogers, the Congress (House and Senate Majorities) and both President Bush and President Obama.  AND MOROCCO SUPPORTS THIS US POSITION. 

     

    • The language also emphasizes the need to resolve protracted refugee issue posed by the refugee camps that have been run by the Polisario for over 35 years by conducting a census of who is living there and working on programs that emphasize resettlement outside of the camps. 

     

    • Thank him again for all of his support and for this important language. 

     

     

     

  • Talking points for calls with Congressman Norman Dicks

    TO: Ambassador Bouhlal 

     

    FR: Ed Gabriel, MAC team 

     

    RE: Phone Call with Rep. Norman Dicks (D-WA) 

     

    The number for the office of Rep. Dicks is 202-225-5916.  

     

    Most of the time, the Congressman will not be available and will call back later in the day.  

     

    Background 

     

    Rep. Norman Dicks is the Ranking Member of the full Appropriations Committee from the state of Washington. He represents Washington’s 6th congressional district, located in the northwestern corner of the state. He is a tireless advocate for environmental conservation and defense policy, as Boeing is a major employer in his district. He was first elected to Congress in 1976. He recently announced that he will not be running for reelection.  

     

    Rep. Dicks is a reliable supporter of Morocco. He signed both the 2007 and the 2009 Congressional letters in support of the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, and also voted in favor of the 2006 Free Trade Agreement. He is a long time friend of Ed Gabriel. 

     

    Rep. Dicks has a very busy week as they are marking up 4 of the biggest Appropriations bills (Homeland, Defense, and Military Construction, in addition to our bill) and will likely not want to talk for a long time. As the Ranking Member, it will be important to him to know that the policy recommendation (resolve based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty) is also the policy of the Obama administration 

     

    Goal 

     

    To Thank Ranking Member Dicks for his support over the years and thank him for the positive report language that was included by the Subcommittee. 

     

    Talking Points 

     

    • Thank Chairman Dicks for his support over the years. 

     

    • Thank him for the positive language that was included by the Subcommittee on the issue of resolving the Western Sahara based. Also note that we always enjoy working with Rep. Lowey (the Ranking Member –Democrat- on the Subcommittee). MAKE SURE to use the correct member reference above for each call you make.  One of the talking points references the Republican member who helped us, the other references the Democratic member who helped us.   

     

    • Morocco very much appreciates this attention from the Congress and we believe your actions will prove very helpful to restore regional security and stability. 

     

    • If he asks for more information you can explain how the positive report language notes how the deteriorating security situation makes it imperative to resolve the dispute over the Western Sahara based on autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.  

     

    • Resolving the dispute based on Autonomy/Sovereignty is the long time position of Ranking Member Dicks, the Congress (House and Senate Majorities) and President Obama, President Bush, and President Clinton.  AND MOROCCO SUPPORTS THIS US POSITION. 

     

    • The language also emphasizes the need to resolve protracted refugee issue posed by the refugee camps that have been run by the Polisario for over 35 years by conducting a census of who is living there and working on programs that emphasize resettlement outside of the camps. 

     

    • Thank him again for all of his support and for this important language. 

     

     

     

  • MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on “advanced status,” e.g. FDI and regional integration

     

    From: Pence, Anne [mailto:apence@cov.com]

    Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 9:47 AM
    To: Bill Hayes; Joe Matthews; Hugh McDowell; Larson, Alan; Edward Gabriel; Fatima Kurtz
    Subject: MINURSO Resolution and reactions; EU-Morocco talks on "advanced status," e.g. FDI and regional integration

    It is "clean" but those involved (e.g. Morocco) may also see messages they may not like -- such as exhortations to provide "unhindered movement", etc. which harken to elements of the SG's report.  At same time, the Resolution is positive about Morocco's steps on human rights, and some by the Polisario with UNHCR.   It references the Moroccan autonomy proposal, but also a 2007 Polisario proposal.    It offers continued support for the Ross process, and mentions that natural resources have been discussed in that context.

    Morocco's public comments are interesting too -- stresses the importance of self-determination (but indicates concern that a referendum would cause tension at an already tense time.

    Meanwhile, EU-Morocco discussion were held in Luxembourg to prepare for the ag trade liberaization agreement in effect July 1 and to discuss a range of other issues under Morocco's "advanced status," including regional integration, the AMU and the positive trend in Morocco-Algeria relations.

    Anne

  • Focal point for securing time for the House and Senate meetings

     

    1.     Secure time available:  Mouaad will be the focal point for securing time for the House meetings and Saida for Senate meetings while Sandrine and Ouissal will be requesting them.  

    2.     Prioritizing upcoming congressional meetings and selecting members.

    Must do meetings:

     •                first with MDB which is scheduled for the 17th

    •                meeting Moroccan Caucus, met with Grim with Mouaad and we are working on a dinner for the co-chairs

    •                meeting with the replacement of Payne, already scheduled for the 18th

                

    Strategic meetings with Chairmen, committees and subcommittees with Jurisdiction our country

     •                House Foreign Affair committee members: Ros-Lehtinen (will do a follow up meeting) and Berman

            -subcommittee:  Chris Smith, Gary Ackerman, Karen Bass (scheduled the 18th)

    •                Senate Foreign Relations: Kerry, Lugar, Casey, Jim Risch

    •                House Appropriations: hall Rogers, Norm Dicks, Kay Granger, Nita Lowey (Mouaad and Jordan met with her staff)

    •                House Appropriations: Inouye, Thad Cochran

    •                House Armed Services: Buck McKeon, Adam Smith

    •                Senate Armed Services: Carl Levin, John McCain

    •                House Intelligence Committee : Mike Rogers, Dutch Ruppersberger

    •                Senate Intelligence Committee : Dianne Feinstein, Saxby Chambliss 

     

    3.     my guys told me that all material for the meetings is prepared by Jordan. This is why I suggested to hold follow up meetings (first one tomorrow at 11am). 

     4.     face to face preparation meeting with you before important congressional visits are very useful but the material and talking points prepared before the meetings can prevent undue pressure on my schedule.

    5.     MAC staff will attend congressional meetings as agreed between us when need be.

    6.  am glad that Congressional staff visits are going well and they should continue, Fouad gives me feedback on all the meetings he attends. I also agree that a summary of the meetings is important as it will provide us with important information about where that members stands on different issues.